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  INTRODUCTION   
The government does many things that are abominable. 
Some are violations of specifically enumerated constitu-
tional provisions, such as the First Amendment right to free 
speech or the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.1 The courts have developed 
elaborate doctrinal criteria to guide elevated scrutiny for rights 
that are explicitly accounted for in the Constitution.  
Others are violations of fundamental rights that are not 
enumerated in the Constitution, but have nevertheless been 
protected through the Due Process clauses.2 These “penumbral” 
rights, such as the right to marital privacy,3 reproductive au-
tonomy,4 and child-rearing decisions,5 have been deemed so 
fundamental to an American sense of liberty that the courts 
scrutinize government interferences with them. The vagueness 
of these fundamental substantive due process rights attracts 
criticism, but their existence and function are broadly accepted.  
That leaves the other cases. These cases correct govern-
ment conduct that implicates no recognized fundamental or 
specifically enumerated right, and deploys no judicially recog-
nized suspect classification. They are the misfits of constitu-
tional law. The cases come in two forms. One set challenges ex-
ecutive actions that are alleged to be outrageous. Successful 
claimants must prove that the government’s conduct “shocks 
the conscience” even of those with the most “hardened sensibili-
ties.”6 The second set challenges legislative and regulatory ac-
tions that are alleged to be irrational. These claimants must 
prove that a law or rule fails rational basis scrutiny and is de-
void of any possible legitimate purpose.7  
Together, the outrageous and irrational cases establish 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV.  
 2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); cf. Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (placing marriage autonomy rights under 
the umbrella of the due process concept of personal liberty). There are two Due 
Process Clauses: the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause constrains the fed-
eral government, and the Fourteenth Amendment constrains the states and 
local governments. Both now protect both substantive and procedural due pro-
cess.  
 3. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
 4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973). 
 5. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); 
Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977). 
 6. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1998); Rochin 
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
 7. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). 
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constitutional floors to provide a minimum of decency and order 
the government must maintain in all of its varied activities. 
Both tests trigger non-elevated, highly deferential judicial re-
view. They provide the lightest of checks on government power; 
indeed, both of the floor tests are hard for the government to 
flunk.8 Nevertheless, their mere existence makes legal observ-
ers queasy. 
The outrageous and irrational tests raise the specter of ju-
dicial overreach. For scholars who fear a revival of Lochnerism9 
(which is to say, for most scholars10), the floor tests look dan-
gerous. The tests can provide a vehicle for courts to create new 
constitutional rights that are unmoored from text and history 
and are insulated by the Constitution from political counter-
moves short of constitutional amendment.11 Moreover, in addi-
tion to the separation of powers problem, the floor tests raise 
doubts about the institutional competence of the courts to un-
derstand the vast range of decisions made by every type of gov-
ernment actor, be it a school teacher, a police officer, or a con-
gressperson.12 And then there are the usual problems of 
amorphous standards—namely, the risk of arbitrary, idiosyn-
cratic, or partisan application.  
Yet despite the seeming soundness of these objections, the 
floor tests have not been abused by the courts. To the contrary, 
it is the widespread reluctance to use the floor tests that has led 
 
 8. The burden of proving this violation has been described as “a virtually 
insurmountable uphill struggle.” See Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 791 
n.4 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 9. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (recognizing a constitu-
tional right to freely contract in the labor market). See infra Part V.A for an 
in-depth discussion.  
 10. See, e.g., John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitu-
tional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 496 (1997); Daniel R. Mandelker, Entitlement 
to Substantive Due Process: Old Versus New Property in Land Use Regulation, 
3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 67–72 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 
87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 877 (1987). But see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILI-
TATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE RE-
FORM (2011). 
 11. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 
849, 863 (1989) (explaining that one danger of nonoriginalism is that judges 
may “mistake their own predilections for the law”). 
 12. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1st ed. 2004) (arguing that history indi-
cates judicial review is not intended to be the primary means of interpreting 
the Constitution); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN IN-
STITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 155 (2006) (“[R]eal-world 
decisionmakers, including judges, have limited capacity to understand and use 
even the information they do have. The problem of bounded information is 
amplified by bounded decision making capacity.”). 
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courts to use other parts of the Constitution to make bold in-
roads into areas of traditional executive and legislative control. 
Thus, by avoiding the use of these constitutional release valves, 
the courts have, ironically, expanded judicial power. 
This Article explains and vindicates the non-fundamental 
rights cases. Its first goal is descriptive. This is the first ac-
count (so far as we know) to clarify the connection between the 
outrageousness test used to challenge executive action and the 
rational basis test used to challenge legislative action under 
due process or equal protection. Both tests root out blatant ex-
ploitations of power that needlessly abuse the disfavored con-
stituents or pointlessly reward the favored. Notwithstanding 
their shared goals and textual bases, the floor tests have not 
been recognized as analytical analogs before.  
Once the outrageousness and irrationality tests are proper-
ly seen as close cousins, a striking inconsistency is revealed. 
The tests have diverging trajectories. The rational basis test is 
enjoying a bit of a comeback. Progressives value the rational 
basis test because of its heroic role in the gay marriage cases.13 
Conservatives and libertarians have growing respect for the ra-
tional basis test because it has been used in the last few years 
to strike down questionable economic regulations.14 At times, 
the test has reinforced the values of libertarians and progres-
sives simultaneously, as when a Texas federal court found that 
a state statute requiring African hair braiding schools to com-
ply with an onerous set of building codes lacked a rational basis 
for doing so.15 Thus, the rational basis test is tolerated across 
the ideological spectrum and is well poised for a modest resur-
gence. 
The outrageousness test, by contrast, still lives in disre-
 
 13. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APART-
HEID OF THE CLOSET (1999) (describing the history of court challenges); Toni 
M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 (1996) (ar-
guing for a rational basis approach to gay rights); infra text accompanying 
notes 99–123; cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 
IND. L.J. 1, 5 (1994) (expressing concern that a rational basis approach may be 
too adventurous).  
 14. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217, 227 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(finding that a Louisiana statute restricting the sale of caskets to licensed fu-
neral homes lacked a rational basis under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 222 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(finding the same for a Tennessee restriction on casket sales). Both cases were 
litigated by the Institute for Justice, an organization dedicated to promoting 
economic liberty rights. 
 15. Brantley v. Kuntz, No. A-13-CA-872-SS, 2015 WL 75244, at *8 (W.D. 
Tex. Jan. 5, 2015). 
2015] OUTRAGEOUS AND IRRATIONAL 285 
 
pute. Its occasional use sends critics clamoring for more judicial 
restraint.16 The Supreme Court has commanded lower courts to 
use the outrageousness test only as a last resort—if the claimed 
injustice has no plausible connection to any other enumerated 
or fundamental constitutional right.17 These constraints were 
intended to limit the drawbacks of an amorphous outrageous-
ness standard, but in the process they wiped out many of the 
benefits. Unlike the rational basis test, which has enough slack 
in the rope to allow lower courts to experiment and respond ad-
equately to new problems, the outrageousness test is kept un-
der strict limits. Its waning scope forces lower courts to choose 
between two bad options when a government agent has abused 
his power. They can either expand their interpretation of fun-
damental and enumerated constitutional rights, or they can let 
the abuse slip between the doctrinal cracks.18  
This brings us to the second goal, the prescriptive objec-
tive, of the Article. The floor tests deserve a formal exoneration. 
While the courts could misuse the tests, the primary problems 
anticipated by critics are more theoretical than actual. Both 
now have long track records without serious compromises to 
the separation of powers. Moreover, in practice, the floor tests 
have a counterintuitive beauty. If one accepts, as we think one 
must, that outrageous and irrational state actions are destined 
 
 16. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (1998) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Radecki v. Barela, 945 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.N.M. 1996) (“[I]ts ap-
plication will change as one federal judge after another struggles to apply it.”), 
rev’d, 146 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Time To Bury 
the Shocks the Conscience Test, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 307, 346–47 (2010) (discuss-
ing the test in detail); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the 
Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 437–41 (1999) (describing prob-
lems with administering the test); Matthew D. Umhofer, Confusing Pursuits: 
Sacramento v. Lewis and the Future of Substantive Due Process in the Execu-
tive Setting, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 437, 438–40 (2001) (highlighting the doc-
trinal ambiguities). But see Paul Gewirtz, On “I Know It When I See It,” 105 
YALE L.J. 1023, 1031–32 (defending the test from criticism of its abdication of 
reason in favor of emotion). See infra Part V.B for a discussion of the criticism 
directed at the outrageousness test. 
 17. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397–98 (1989). 
 18. Others have worried about doctrine-distorting effects of compelling 
courts to give rights all-or-nothing scrutiny, though their concern is that ex-
panding rights results in less protection for rights that lie at the core of the 
applicable amendment. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1823 (2009) (discussing equal protection rights); Philip Ham-
burger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835 (2004) (discussing religious freedom); 
Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 
SUP. CT. REV. 271 (2004) (discussing speech and press rights). But see John D. 
Inazu, More Is More: Strengthening Free Exercise, Speech, and Association, 99 
MINN. L. REV. 485 (2014) (critiquing Hamburger’s thesis on the expansion of 
rights). 
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to occasionally persuade the courts to respond, then the outra-
geousness and rational basis tests actually provide a conserva-
tive option for judicial intervention.  
The tests give courts a viable alternative to expanding 
enumerated or fundamental rights or suspect classifications to 
cover the offensive government conduct. Were the current 
floors jettisoned, the basic principles they reflect almost cer-
tainly would reappear under different constitutional cover, in a 
reinterpretation of some other right. Yet there is little reason to 
think these other constitutional cubby-holes would be better 
homes—or should be the exclusive homes—for addressing the 
range of contexts and liberty concerns reflected in the floor cas-
es.19 Many would be worse, requiring new epicycles in the al-
ready-complex rules that have accumulated around the enu-
merated rights. 
Indeed, this dynamic between the constraints on substan-
tive due process and the subsequent bloating of other rights al-
ready has occurred in the context of criminal procedural rights. 
As the outrageousness test has been reined in, courts have 
compensated by correcting bad police behavior through more 
expansive interpretations of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments. In some instances, bad facts have driven courts to cre-
ate new rules that unnecessarily complicate and confuse exist-
ing doctrine.20 For example, the courts have introduced 
contradictions into Fourth Amendment precedent in order to 
redress scandalous disciplinary measures and searches per-
 
 19. Constitutional cubby-holing is a relatively recent phenomenon. Owen 
Fiss has noted that in earlier eras “constitutional interpretation was not an 
exercise in clause-parsing.” OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE 
MODERN STATE, 1888–1910 85 (1993). Victoria Nourse “would go further and 
suggest it was not interpretative at all in the modern sense. Interpretation as-
sumes a textualist view of the Constitution; but the police power—the most 
ubiquitous concept in constitutional analysis during [the late nineteenth and 
the early twentieth centuries]—had no textual basis.” Victoria F. Nourse, A 
Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the 
Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 751, 763 (2009). In fact, she adds, 
for some “enumeration was considered a positive evil or at the least irrelevant, 
rather than the self-evident good it is portrayed as today.” Id. at 764; cf. Nor-
man Redlich, Are There “Certain Rights . . . Retained by the People?”, 37 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 787, 787 (1962) (“[W]e may be approaching an era where hu-
man dignity and liberty will require protection of rights other than those con-
tained in the first eight amendments.”). We argue further that the constitu-
tional floors, not just new fundamental rights, can contribute to the ability of 
courts to address human dignity and liberty concerns that may not immediate-
ly warrant the development of a full fundamental right or suspect class treat-
ment. 
 20. AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 1 (1997) (“The Fourth Amendment today is an embarrassment.”). 
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formed at public schools.21 And they have had to make excep-
tions to the exceptions to the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination in order to redress unusually bad po-
lice practices.22 The outrageousness test could have provided a 
stopgap before these other rights were expanded. By resisting 
thoughtful use of substantive due process, courts are counter-
intuitively expanding the reach of their constitutional review 
by couching their decisions in other, untouchable, constitution-
al rights. 
In short, we argue that the very flexibility that critics ab-
hor allows the floor tests to promote justice in modest steps 
while maintaining the analytical coherence of the rest of the 
Constitution. The vagueness of the doctrines requires courts to 
limit their holdings and reasoning to the facts before them and 
to leave other rights to expand slowly and deliberately, if at all. 
We exhort courts and commentators to think anew about 
the outrageous and irrational tests. The profound skepticism 
about them served a vital purpose at one time to ensure that 
they remained modest. But that work is done. Judges will con-
tinue to confront many scenarios in which they simply hold 
their noses and uphold government conduct that they find dis-
tasteful, stupid, clunky, corrupt, invasive, or worse.23 Today, 
the greater risk stems from courts overreacting to the floor 
tests. Too much skepticism deprives us of a valuable judicial 
resource. We therefore advocate for (carefully) increased use of 
outrageousness and irrationality scrutiny to allow liberty 
claims to develop organically, cautiously, and contextually.  
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I defines the outra-
geousness test and explains its origins. Part II does the same 
for the irrationality test. Part III identifies the shared purposes 
of the outrageousness and irrationality tests and differentiates 
them from other constitutional rights (including other substan-
tive due process rights). Part IV describes some confusion in 
 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 295–99.   
 22. See discussion of Oregon v. Elstad and Missouri v. Siebert infra notes 
303–11.  
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 48–62. Yet the courts also re-
spond—albeit rarely—to the most egregious abuses of government power. As 
Herbert Packer said over fifty years ago, “No one, Supreme Court Justices in-
cluded, is immune to the force of the horrible example. And therein lies the 
Due Process Model’s peculiar strength. . . . It would take a conspiracy of si-
lence to check the mobilization of energies that perpetuates the Due Process 
revolution.” Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 64 (1964). The outrageousness and irrationality tests can play a cru-
cial role in monitoring these worst-case scenarios. 
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the precedent and legal scholarship that has led to doctrinal 
distortion. Part V explores the theoretical and doctrinal attacks 
that each floor test has faced and challenges their implicit as-
sumptions. Part VI vindicates both tests by exploring their po-
tential to manage irrational and outrageous government con-
duct. 
I.  OUTRAGEOUS   
One July morning in 1949, three Los Angeles County sher-
iff deputies entered the house of Antonio Rochin.24 The sheriffs 
entered without a warrant, but that deficiency, which seems so 
glaring now, would not have mattered much at the time.25 The 
Fourth Amendment’s protection against warrantless and un-
reasonable searches and seizures was incorporated into the 
Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states less 
than one month earlier, and the case, Wolf v. Colorado,26 de-
clined to adopt the exclusionary rule against state governments 
out of deference to federalism and a commitment to judicial re-
straint.27  
But the investigation got worse. After breaking through 
Rochin’s bedroom door, the deputies observed two capsules that 
contained morphine.28 The deputies were investigating Rochin 
for the sale of narcotics and suspected the capsules contained 
illicit drugs.29 One of the deputies asked, “Whose stuff is this?”30 
In response, Rochin grabbed the capsules, put them in his 
mouth, and, after a struggle with the deputies, swallowed.31 For 
the deputies, the matter was not over. Either out of a fierce de-
sire to preserve evidence or out of sheer retribution, the depu-
ties took Rochin to the nearest hospital and forcibly pumped 
Rochin’s stomach until he vomited the capsules.32  
This conduct was a bridge too far. Even Justice Frankfur-
ter, the author of the Wolf opinion who had strongly cautioned 
the Court against overextending its authority, believed that the 
Court had a responsibility to correct what happened to 
 
 24. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952). 
 25. Id. at 166–67. 
 26. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 27. Id. at 32. 
 28. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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Rochin.33 This case was not one that put the Court at risk of 
substituting the sheriff’s idiosyncratic judgment with its own.34 
No, the deputies’ conduct did more “than offend some fastidious 
squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting 
crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the con-
science.”35 Thus, in Rochin v. California, under Frankfurter’s 
direction, the Court concluded that judges may intervene in the 
conduct of state (and other) authorities that is so outrageous 
that it offends more than judges’ logic and traditions; it offends 
the “traditions and conscience of our people.”36  
Justice Frankfurter recognized the elasticity of the terms 
“decency” and “shocking,” but stated that “[i]n dealing not with 
the machinery of government but with human rights, the ab-
sence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of meaning, is not 
an unused or even regrettable attribute of constitutional provi-
sions.”37 On the contrary, this is a matter of judicial judgment 
based on “considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the 
compelling traditions of the legal profession.”38 As he put it, a 
“shocks the conscience” due process boundary on executive con-
duct is “historic and generative.”39 
The Rochin test has taken a beating ever since. 
The origins of the outrageousness test (also known as the 
“shocks the conscience” test)40 may seem like a historical anom-
aly. After all, today the facts of Rochin would easily qualify for 
a Fourth Amendment challenge, and the evidence used against 
Rochin would be excluded on that basis. Indeed, the Fourth 
Amendment now protects individuals from blood draws and 
other much less invasive procedures than a stomach pump,41 
and the Fourth Amendment has a “surgical search” doctrine 
that renders some invasive surgical processes to extract bullets 
or other evidence a constitutional violation even if the police 
 
 33. Id. at 169, 172; Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31–33 (1949). 
 34. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 170–71 (“We may not draw on our merely personal 
and private notions and disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial 
function.”). 
 35. Id. at 172. 
 36. Id. at 175. 
 37. Id. at 169 (emphasis added). 
 38. Id. at 175. 
 39. Id. at 173 (emphasis added). 
 40. Kenneth Miller, Outrageous Government Conduct that Shocks the 
Conscience, 25 FED. PRAC. 81, 81 (1998). 
 41. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (“We hold that the 
privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against him-
self.”). 
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have probable cause and a warrant.42 At first blush, it may 
seem that the outrageous conduct analyzed in Rochin eventual-
ly would have come under the Fourth Amendment umbrella, 
and the Court could have ended up with the right result with-
out relying on dubious substantive due process review.43 But as 
a purely historical matter, this gets the order reversed. All of 
the blood draw and surgical search cases used Rochin to sup-
port the recognition of a Fourth Amendment problem,44 and 
there’s little reason to assume that the Fourth Amendment de-
velopment would have been inevitable. 
This is not unique. Other rights that were once analyzed as 
substantive due process rights have been overtaken by other 
amendments. For example, prior to the incorporation of the 
Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination, criminal 
defendants who were investigated by state (as opposed to fed-
eral) police were protected from coerced and involuntary con-
fessions through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.45 Today, these rights are so strongly and automat-
ically associated with justice that their emergence as funda-
mental rights seems almost inevitable, but it isn’t so. The first 
stage of development was the tentative judicial testing afforded 
by the vague promises of due process. 
The outrageousness test screens for abuses of official power 
of any variety, and because the scope is so wide, the courts also 
ensure that the protection is weak. It is used sparingly, only for 
misconduct that nearly everyone would agree is wrong. As one 
court has put it, “before a constitutional infringement occurs, 
state action must in and of itself be egregiously unacceptable, 
outrageous, or conscience-shocking.”46 Arbitrary and irrational 
conduct is not necessarily outrageous under this test; it must 
also shock the conscience.47 But even with the tables tilted 
dramatically in the government’s favor, litigants use the outra-
geousness test and win, albeit rarely, when they cannot find a 
 
 42. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985). 
 43. Indeed, this reversed logic seems to be at the center of the Court’s lat-
er precedent instructing lower courts to preferentially use enumerated rights 
rather than substantive due process. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 
393–95 (1989). 
 44. See, e.g., Winston, 470 U.S. at 760–63; Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759–60. 
 45. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236–37 (1941) (reviewing cas-
es where confessions were extracted by improper means); Brown v. Mississip-
pi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936). 
 46. Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 754 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 47. See, e.g., Pyles v. Village of Manteno, No. 13-CV-2114, 2013 WL 
6459484, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2013) (finding that the failure to disclose evi-
dence in order to indict plaintiff satisfied this test). 
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suitable constitutional route out of a jam. Lower courts invoke 
this minimum decency baseline in cases challenging govern-
ment misconduct, even as they consistently reassure the other 
branches that the baseline is low and reserved for cases of ex-
ceptionally bad—that is, outrageous—behavior.  
The test is also invoked, and taken seriously, in some of the 
losing cases. In the 1992 case of Collins v. Harker Heights,48 the 
Court concluded the shocks-the-conscience standard was not 
violated when a city failed to train or warn city workers about 
asphyxiation dangers, and a sewer worker perished while at-
tempting to clear an underground sewer line.49 In County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, it likewise held that the standard was not 
violated when a deputy sheriff pursued a motorcyclist at 100 
miles per hour through a residential neighborhood, at a dis-
tance of 100 feet.50 And in NASA v. Nelson, the Court was will-
ing to “assume” that Americans have a constitutional interest 
in privacy that springs from the Due Process Clause (though 
the constitutional minimum threshold for privacy was not vio-
lated by extensive background checks on government employ-
ees).51 
Objections to confinement or parole conditions also are 
sometimes couched as substantive due process violations, 
though few succeed. In Catanzaro v. Harry, the federal district 
court reviewed but rejected the prisoner’s claim that his due 
process rights were violated by a decision to transfer him to the 
Residential Sex Offender Program at the Kalamazoo Probation 
Enhancement Program facility because a physician did not 
make the decision.52 Nor did the prisoner’s required participa-
tion in the Sex Offender Program as a condition of parole shock 
the conscience.53  
In a particularly chilling case, on contested facts, a district 
court ruled that a Border Patrol agent did not shock the con-
science when he shone his headlights on an undocumented per-
son attempting to cross the Rio Grande illegally, began driving 
the vehicle toward her, and then drove over her with his back 
tires.54 He then lifted her up, pulled her into the back seat of his 
vehicle torso first, stepped to the other side and pulled her into 
 
 48. 503 U.S. 115 (1992). 
 49. Id. at 117–18, 129. 
 50. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836–37 (1998). 
 51. NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 746 (2011). 
 52. Catanzaro v. Harry, 848 F. Supp. 2d 780, 798–99 (W.D. Mich. 2012). 
 53. Id. at 799. 
 54. Carcamo-Lopez v. Doe, 865 F. Supp. 2d 736, 742–43 (W.D. Tex. 2011). 
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the vehicle, and then drove her to meet EMT technicians, who 
then took her to the hospital.55  
Also bracing is a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
cision, in which the government indisputably sent a paid confi-
dential informant to a poor, minority community in Phoenix, 
Arizona, “with instructions to recruit random persons to help 
rob a non-existent cocaine stash house.”56 Worth emphasizing 
here is the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.57 Judge 
Reinhardt—joined by Chief Judge Kozinski—noted as follows: 
As we have long recognized, the Due Process Clause requires us to 
dismiss the indictment in “extreme cases in which the government’s 
conduct violates fundamental fairness.” In other words, a conviction 
must fall where “the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outra-
geous that due process principles would absolutely bar the govern-
ment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.”
58
 
Among other things, the dissenting judges worried about 
the overwhelming temptation that sting operations like this 
may pose for the most economically vulnerable in hard econom-
ic times.59 But the judges thought the liberty concerns went be-
yond the risk of a disparate impact and warned that “[t]he gov-
ernment verges too close to tyranny when it sends its agents 
trolling through bars, tempts people to engage in criminal con-
duct, and locks them up for unconscionable periods of time 
when they fall for the scheme.”60 Moreover, such acts cannot be 
justified on the bare claim that the outrageous conduct “will 
advance law enforcement goals.”61 Of course they will advance 
law enforcement goals, if one construes those goals with no re-
gard for calibration or equity. The dissent objected to how read-
ily the majority opinion nodded to government law enforcement 
justifications and lamented that “the outrageous government 
conduct doctrine has little or no continued vitality in this Cir-
cuit.”62  
The case underscores how weak that doctrine is, even in 
the allegedly pro-defendant Ninth Circuit. But the doctrine is 
not dead, and should not be—for the very reasons given by the 
 
 55. Id. at 743. 
 56. United States v. Black, 750 F.3d 1053, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 1054. 
 58. Id. at 1055 (quoting United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1209 
(9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973)). 
 59. Id. at 1056. 
 60. Id. at 1057. 
 61. Id. at 1060. 
 62. Id.  
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dissent. The case shows how wrong-headed uncritical deference 
to government is if one shares the dissent’s concerns about 
“Orwellian” abuse of government power.63 As the dissent put it: 
“Do we really need to add to the extraordinary number of our 
youth whom we now imprison those our government can induce 
to commit fictitious crimes?”64  
These fake crime sting operations, the dissent continued, 
“are one of the most extreme and chilling manifestations of an 
overzealous criminal system that often fails to respect the 
boundaries of law, good public policy, and simple decency.”65 
Upholding such conduct thus poses serious, modern, real-world 
liberty risks that may otherwise evade meaningful constitu-
tional review. Phoenix is, after all, located in Maricopa County, 
Arizona—the stomping ground of “Sheriff Joe” Arpaio, known 
for a variety of particularly stunning and abusive law enforce-
ment tactics.66 Yet concern about physically abusive or other-
wise outrageous law enforcement tactics is hardly confined to 
Maricopa County, as national outrage over perceived abuses of 
law enforcement authority proves. 
Verbal abuse and psychological threats may be sufficiently 
outrageous to breach the “brutal and inhumane abuse of official 
power”67 formidable wall.68 Calling a student a prostitute in 
front of the class, and continuing to refer to the student in such 
 
 63. Id. at 1057 (describing the police tactics as those that call to mind 
George Orwell’s 1984, or Phillip K. Dick’s The Minority Report). 
 64. Id. at 1058. 
 65. Id. 
 66. For a description of the pattern and practice of discriminatory law en-
forcement conduct by Sheriff Arpaio, see Complaint at 1–3, United States v. 
Maricopa County, No. 2:12-cv-00981:LOA (D. Ariz. May 10, 2012); see also 
Complaint at 1–8, United States v. Maricopa County, No. 2:10-cv-01878-GMS 
(D. Ariz. Sept. 2, 2010). See generally Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 
(D. Ariz. 2013). 
 67. Emily F. Suski, Dark Sarcasm in the Classroom: The Failure of the 
Courts To Recognize Students’ Severe Emotional Harm as Unconstitutional, 62 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 125, 132 (2014) (quoting Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 
(4th Cir. 1980)) (arguing that courts should be more willing to find substantive 
due process violations when government officials in schools inflict serious emo-
tional harm on students); see also Alberici v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 
12-10511-JFW (VBKx), 2013 WL 5573045, at *16–19 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013); 
Turner v. Unknown Parties # 1, No. 1:11-cv-1128, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16674, at *26–28 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 9, 2012) (noting that verbal harassment by 
a prison official, calling plaintiff a “bitch” and telling him not to “turn a stick 
up into a murder,” did not shock the conscience).  
 68. See, e.g., Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F. Supp. 2d 81, 101 (D.R.I. 2006) 
(sympathizing with plaintiff’s “apparently-undeserved disrespectful and un-
pleasant treatment” but certain that “no reasonable jury would conclude that 
[the] conduct violated universal standards of societal decency”). 
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a fashion for several weeks will not violate the standard,69 but 
the courts have said they “can imagine a case where psycholog-
ical harassment might be so severe that it would amount to tor-
ture. . . .”70 In general, hostile threats or intimidation are sel-
dom sufficient, even in the criminal process; courts instead look 
for evidence that rises to the level of “sophisticated psychologi-
cal torture.”71 
Courts also look for patterns of severe abuse, rather than 
isolated police misconduct that intentionally singles out an in-
dividual short of the “conscience-shocking” mark. One govern-
ment administrative official’s rude, arbitrary, or even hostile 
behavior typically will not suffice. Minor burdens, even if cu-
mulative, also are insufficient. For example, a plaintiff who re-
ceived 24 bogus parking tickets and alleged a pattern of police 
harassment did not satisfy the shocks-the-conscience test.72 Nor 
did the plaintiff who was issued a single erroneous parking 
ticket, although he had no actual or constructive notice that he 
had to pay for parking.73 
Even serious privacy invasions may not suffice. A wiretap 
that resulted in the interception of a confidential phone conver-
sation among a defendant, his mother, and a defense investiga-
tor did not violate the standard, absent evidence of intent to in-
 
 69. See Abeyta v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., 77 F.3d 1253, 1255 
(10th Cir. 1996). 
 70. Id. at 1258. 
 71. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding 
that hours of mistreatment, coupled with “sophisticated psychological torture” 
that was “a twentieth-century inquisitorial version of the Star Chamber” 
shocked the conscience); see, e.g., Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 994–95 
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that police officers’ hostile, aggressive and condescend-
ing threats of arrest during dispute did not shock the conscience); Pettit v. 
City of Orting, No. C12-5744 BHS, 2013 WL 414231, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 1, 
2013). Nevertheless, coercive interrogation arguably can, in some circum-
stances, violate substantive due process. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 
760, 780 (2003) (remanding case for court to determine if party could pursue a 
claim of liability for substantive due process); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 
109 (1985). 
 72. See, e.g., Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 750–51 (7th Cir. 
2012); see also Brittain, 451 F.3d at 995 (holding that police officer’s interfer-
ence with mother’s exercise of court-ordered visitation rights did not violate 
substantive due process and was not conscience-shocking); Shelton v. Astrue, 
No. 5:12CV00009, 2013 WL 278617, at *3, 9 (W.D. Va. Jan 24, 2013) (finding 
that the alleged frustration by administrative employees of a plaintiff’s effort 
to secure Social Security benefits did not shock the conscience).  
 73. Peruta v. City of Hartford, No. 3:09-CV-1946 VLB, 2012 WL 3656366, 
at *10 (D. Conn. Aug. 24, 2012); cf. Sheng v. City of New York, No. CV-05-
1118-RRM VVP, 2009 WL 6871132, at *11–12 (E.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (hold-
ing that the issuance of multiple parking violation summonses, which led to 
seizure of car, did not violate substantive due process). 
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vade the defendant’s attorney-client privilege.74 Moreover, a so-
cial worker’s decision to allow a child to be removed from his 
parents and remain with his maternal grandmother, as ap-
proved by the Juvenile Court, did not shock the conscience.75 
Finally, Herrera v. Collins may constitute the low water 
mark for substantive due process.76 A capital defendant facing 
the death penalty urged in a federal habeas petition that he 
had newly discovered evidence of his actual innocence. The 
Court held that this “freestanding claim” of actual innocence 
did not support the miscarriage of justice exception, even in a 
capital case.77 Nor could a due process-based demand for a new 
trial prevail absent history to support such a claim.78 Yet in a 
dissent joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, Justice 
Blackmun observed that “[n]othing could be more contrary to 
contemporary standards of decency or more shocking to the 
conscience than to execute a person who is actually innocent.”79 
Here again, the due process argument failed, along with the 
fundamental rights arguments that any capital case entails, 
but only after vetting all the way to the Supreme Court.80 
Although these cases illustrate the myriad ways that a 
shocks-the-conscience argument can fail, careful readers will 
also see frequent reassurance from the courts that the outra-
geousness test continues to constrain government acts. For ex-
ample, “an officer’s use of false evidence to secure a conviction 
is capable of shocking the conscience.”81 When a coach deliber-
ately struck a high school student in the eye with a heavy ob-
ject, with sufficient force to blind her in one eye, this shocked 
the conscience.82 The asserted disciplinary justification was not 
enough to insulate the behavior from substantive due process 
 
 74. See People v. Alexander, 235 P.3d 873, 878 (Cal. 2010). 
 75. See Alberici v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 12-10511 JFW VBKX, 
2013 WL 5573045, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (stating that to prevail on a 
due process claim based on unwarranted interference with familial rights a 
plaintiff must show “that the government’s action at issue was so egregious or 
ill-conceived that it shocks the conscience”). 
 76. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 77. Id. at 401. 
 78. Id. at 411. 
 79. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Herrera was executed. For a re-
cent analysis of erroneous conviction of innocent defendants in capital cases, 
see Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants 
Who Are Sentenced to Death, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 7230 (2014). 
 80. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 411, 417. 
 81. White v. Smith, 808 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1242 (D. Neb. 2011). 
 82. See Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1076 
(11th Cir. 2000).  
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review. Likewise, “when a police officer not faced with an 
emergency drives his vehicle through a red light at sixty-four 
miles per hour on a dark and snowy winter night and kills an 
innocent seventeen year-old girl, such actions rise to the level 
of conscience-shocking.”83  
Unjustified physical harm and control provide obvious 
grounds for a shocks-the-conscience challenge, but emotional 
harms and affronts to dignity can give rise to successful claims 
as well. Some courts have stated that “there is no meaningful 
distinction between physical and psychological harm.”84 For ex-
ample, one court held that law enforcement conduct shocked 
the conscience where an arrestee extracted drugs from her own 
vagina after police threatened her that they would be extracted 
involuntarily, and claimed falsely that they had a search war-
rant to transport her to a local hospital for that purpose.85 
These examples demonstrate two things that matter to our 
arguments here. First, the outrageousness test is not complete-
ly impotent. In some cases the argument prevails, though these 
are quite rare occurrences. In others courts recite a commit-
ment to protect the public from government abuses. Second, the 
outrageousness test is a weak constraint at best. It is a brake 
on government conduct beyond the pale.  
II.  IRRATIONAL   
Closely related to the shocks-the-conscience hand brake on 
outrageous executive action is the more generally applicable ra-
tional basis test. Whether employed through the Due Process 
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, the rational basis test 
mandates that government action cannot be wholly arbitrary or 
malicious.86 As Richard Fallon has observed, the constitutional 
 
 83. Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975, 985 (8th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omit-
ted).  
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(citing United States v. Chin, 934 F.2d 393, 399 n.4 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 85. See United States v. Anderson, No. 5:13-CR-24, 2013 WL 5769976, at 
*9–12 (D. Vt. Oct. 24, 2013), rev’d, 772 F.3d 969 (2d Cir. 2014). In reversing 
the order of the district court to suppress the unlawfully obtained evidence, 
the Second Circuit did not address whether there was a due process violation, 
but instead held that the defendant, who did not have the actual conduct per-
formed on his own person, did not have standing to bring the claim. United 
States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 969, 970 (2d Cir. 2014).  
 86. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486–87 (1955). 
As Fallon has observed, “[T]he intuitive idea is not mysterious: government 
officials must act on public spirited rather than self-interested or invidious 
motivations, and there must be a ‘rational’ or reasonable relationship between 
government’s ends and its means.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions 
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duty of care that due process imposes on state actors is a “gen-
eral duty on government officials to behave ‘rationally’ in their 
selection of both ends and means.”87 Much like the outrageous-
ness cases, the irrationality cases are a gnarl, and the doctrinal 
and practical obstacles to a successful challenge abound. But 
the rational basis test still is invoked, and occasionally is suc-
cessful.  
The rational basis test has developed with profound defer-
ence to the government imbedded into its core. Courts employ 
elevated scrutiny only for fundamental rights or suspect classi-
fications.88 The rest of the time courts demand only the faintest 
evidence of rationality to survive constitutional review. The 
test is so deferential that it has confused some courts into 
wrongly assuming that only fundamental rights trigger sub-
stantive due process.89 In fact, all lawmaking must have a ra-
tional basis,90 though its exceedingly low bar is often the most 
rigorous constitutional scrutiny that federal or state law mak-
ing will receive.91 
The most commonly invoked version of the rational basis 
test is tracked back to Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 
Inc. in which the Supreme Court upheld a state law requiring a 
prescription by a licensed eye professional before glasses may 
be fitted with lenses.92 First, there must be a plausible rationale 
 
About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. 
L. REV. 309, 310 (1993). 
 87. Id. at 362; cf. Packer, supra note 23, at 65 (“[A]n important dimension 
of the Due Process ideology is in its insistence upon equality in the operation 
of the criminal process.”). 
 88. And even in these cases, the substantive due process precedent often 
subjects state government rule-making to what Richard Fallon has called a 
form of abstention doctrine that relegates claims against state officials to state 
courts and state remedies. Fallon, supra note 86, at 310–11. 
 89. See infra text accompanying notes 168–77. 
 90. Rational basis scrutiny also applies to federal law-making, not merely 
state and local law-making, even though the federalism concerns that contrib-
ute to greater judicial unwillingness to second-guess state law-making and en-
forcement are absent. 
 91. Moreover, many other rules—e.g. standing, official immunity, sover-
eign immunity, stricter pleading requirements—likewise impose barriers to 
judicial relief for outrageous or irrational government conduct. And as applied 
to federal lawmaking, there is a preliminary step that confines legislative 
power—it must be supported by one of Congress’s enumerated sources of law-
making authority. See Erwin Chemerinsky, How the Supreme Court Protects 
Bad Cops, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2014, at A23 (discussing many obstacles to 
suits against governmental entities). With states, this first step is arguably 
easier to surmount, given the expansive modern view of state police powers. 
 92. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–89 (1955). 
298 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:281 
 
for the legislation.93 This need not be the actual reason legisla-
tors had in mind when adopting the measure; it can be stated 
(or invented) post hoc.94 Second, the means chosen to advance 
the end may be extremely over-inclusive or under-inclusive; it 
need only tend to advance the alleged legitimate end feebly.95 
The same excessively forgiving test applies whether one chal-
lenges the end of the government action under substantive due 
process or the ways in which it allocates burdens and benefits 
under equal protection. The heavy burden of showing that the 
measure is irrational rests with the party challenging it, not 
with the government.96 
The rational basis test is usually applied to legislation.97 
Such cases arguably are better vehicles for substantive due 
process than are the challenges to executive misconduct insofar 
as “due process law [increasingly] aims less to correct individu-
al injustices than to structure and maintain a regime in which 
courts ensure that governmental law-breaking does not reach 
intolerable levels; this latter ambition is more clearly implicat-
ed in challenges to rules and legislation than in individual tort 
actions.”98 In other words, due process is better deployed to root 
out systemic government arbitrary conduct than to function as 
a roving, constitutional tort system to correct for more isolated 
misdeeds.  
This may be one reason for the rational basis test’s resur-
gence. Unlike the outrageousness test, it may have garnered 
more understanding from jurists and the legal community at 
inception, which helped the current generation of lawyers to 
appreciate its virtues, if used sparingly. Whatever the reason 
for its greater acceptance, the rational basis test has played a 
starring role in the modern development of so-called “gay” con-
stitutional rights—a story told briefly here as part of a broader 
tale about constitutional floors. 
 
 93. Id. at 488. 
 94. Id. at 487 (detailing all the possible reasons the legislature may have 
passed the law). 
 95. Id. at 486. 
 96. Id. at 488; see also St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223 (5th 
Cir. 2013). 
 97. See, e.g., Bonner v. City of Brighton, 848 N.W.2d 380, 388, 391 n.43 
(Mich. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 230 (2014) (challenging municipal ordi-
nance on substantive and procedural due process grounds). For a discussion of 
property claims under due process, see E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. 
MASSARO, THE ARC OF DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 42–
44, 56–68 (2013); see also Stephen J. Massey, Justice Rehnquist’s Theory of 
Property, 93 YALE L.J. 541, 542–44 (1984). 
 98. Fallon, supra note 86, at 339–52. 
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In the 1990’s, the legal community began to build the in-
frastructure for a gay rights revolution. Challenges to laws that 
criminalized sexual conduct, discriminated against gay and 
lesbian people in employment, and prohibited same-sex mar-
riage were brought with increasing frequency.99 But the optimal 
legal strategy for attacking these laws was intensely debated.100 
One approach that seemed well-suited for that constitu-
tional moment was to seek “thin” constitutional rights—that is, 
to use the rational basis tests from the Equal Protection Clause 
or Due Process Clauses—rather than pursuing only the thicker 
protection that comes from fundamental rights or suspect clas-
sification under the Equal Protection Clause.101 Despite the 
many problems with a rational basis approach—especially the 
ease with which the rational basis standard can be overcome—
the thin approach proved to be a shrewd tool for challenging 
laws that discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation.102 It 
avoided the “reverse discrimination” doctrine that has ensnared 
race- and gender-based equal protection law;103 it avoided re-
 
 99. See generally BARRY D. ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN 
MOVEMENT (1995) (detailing gay and lesbian movements worldwide); ELLEN 
ANN ANDERSON, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPOR-
TUNITY STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION (2004) (developing a perspec-
tive that analyzes how and why litigation was used as a tool in the gay rights 
movement); PATRICIA CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND 
COURTS IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2000) (examining 
rights based arguments in the gay rights movement); ESKRIDGE, supra note 
13; NAN D. HUNTER ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN (3d ed. 
1992); Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Com-
ment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1643 (1993) (discussing the concept of coupling and its absence in gay 
and lesbian litigation); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards 
Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 
915 (1989) (discussing the levels of equal protection scrutiny that should be 
applied to legislation targeting gay, lesbian, and bisexuals); Rhonda R. Rivera, 
Queer Law: Sexual Orientation in the Mid-Eighties: Part I, 10 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 459 (1985) (surveying legal sources affecting homosexual individuals); 
William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among 
Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623 
(1997) (examining group decision making in litigation). 
 100. See Massaro, supra note 13 (discussing debate about legal strategies); 
Rubenstein, supra note 99; Sunstein, supra note 13. 
 101. See Massaro, supra note 13. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Elevated scrutiny, of course, has resulted in the reversal of some race-
conscious affirmative action by the government where the measures were held 
not to satisfy strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seat-
tle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination 
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510–11 (1989). 
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solving thorny issues of immutability or political powerlessness 
that plagued some arguments for suspect classification;104 and 
it allowed courts to proceed incrementally and contextually.105 
Most importantly, it put pressure on government to explain 
why sexual orientation distinctions make sense, on a case-by-
case basis.106  
This strategy turned the rational basis test’s weakness into 
its strength. The same-sex marriage cases, for example, put on 
public display the states’ inability to assert a single objectively 
reasonable, secular and constitutionally adequate basis for dis-
criminating against same-sex couples. Even the litigation suc-
cesses for state governments became Pyrrhic victories, as the 
injustice of the laws gained more and more attention and 
pushed to the light concerns that the laws, too, were products of 
irrational bias.107 To be sure, litigants typically coupled the thin 
rational basis arguments with thicker arguments for elevated 
scrutiny, but they pushed hard on the irrationality point and 
demanded open and transparent reasons for the laws. 
The strategy worked.108 
Context by context, courts confronted laws that discrimi-
nated on the basis of sexual orientation. They began with crim-
inal prohibitions on private adult sexual conduct,109 worked 
slowly to marriage laws,110 and struck down some laws using a 
blend of substantive due process and equal protection rational 
basis—not elevated scrutiny—analysis.111 In each context, the 
question put to the fore was whether the particular law was ra-
tional in a constitutional sense, versus as an abstract or perfec-
 
 104. See infra text accompanying notes 234–36. 
 105. See Massaro, supra note 13. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Once the courts detected animus they became unwilling “to tolerate 
wildly over- or underinclusive laws.” See Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: 
Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 248 (discussing the 
animus factor and how cases that involve it defy standard equal protection re-
view). 
 108. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013) (strik-
ing down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act on the grounds that it was 
irrational and displayed animus against gay and lesbian couples, as well as on 
federalism grounds). 
 109. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (involving criminal anti-sodomy statutes). 
 110. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 65 (Haw. 1993), abrogated by 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003).  
 111. See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996).  
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tionist form of rationality.112 In each context, asking that ques-
tion raised concerns that animus or selective indifference was 
the real explanation for the measure, rather than a legitimate 
public end.113 In each context, the feeble government justifica-
tions were weighed against the substantial burdens imposed by 
the laws.114 In each context, the courtroom airing advanced pub-
lic debate about how the government balanced the asserted le-
gal rights, individual burdens, and evolving cultural norms.  
Perhaps the most poignant tipping point occurred when 
the lawyer defending Proposition 8, the California ban on 
same-sex marriage, was asked what harm to opposite-sex mar-
riages would occur if same-sex marriages were allowed. His 
limp answer, “I don’t know. I don’t know,”115 reverberated 
throughout the courtroom. 
The decisions overturning laws that discriminate on the 
basis of sexual orientation are analytically fuzzy. In them 
courts applied a mixture of liberty and equality themes, in-
voked vague nouns like “dignity,”116 emphasized liberalism-
based objections to animus or caste,117 and focused on the 
 
 112. See Carpenter, supra note 107 (discussing the development of the an-
imus strand in LGBTQ cases). 
 113. See id. 
 114. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–90 (discussing the impact on fami-
lies). 
 115. Edmund White, I Do, I Do, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2014, at 26, 27 
(discussing the battle for gay marriage, and characterizing the courtroom 
statement by lawyer Chuck Cooper as “an admission of defeat”). Similarly fee-
ble responses to questions about why prohibitions on same-sex marriage are 
justified led to an opinion by Judge Posner that is the most powerful to date in 
terms of its vigorous condemnation of the irrationality of the government’s ar-
guments. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that 
the laws discriminated against a minority defined by an immutable character-
istic, “and the only rationale that the states put forth with any conviction—
that same-sex couples and their children don’t need marriage because same-
sex couples can’t produce children—intended or unintended—is so full of holes 
that it cannot be taken seriously”); see also Mark Joseph Stern, Listen to a 
Conservative Judge Brutally Destroy Arguments Against Gay Marriage, 
SLATE: OUTWARD (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/ 
08/27/listen_to_judge_richard_posner_destroy_arguments_against_gay_marria
ge.html (excerpting some of the more memorable oral arguments from the 
case). But see DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 420–21 (6th Cir. 2014) (uphold-
ing a same-sex marriage ban on grounds of judicial restraint, separation of 
powers, federalism, and tradition), rev’d sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584 (2015); Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 919 (E.D. La. 
2014) (holding that a ban on same-sex marriage is rational because marriage 
is a legitimate concern of state law, and the value of state decisions reached by 
a “democratic process” is sufficient to satisfy the rational basis test). 
 116. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689. 
 117. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (saying that the government cannot “de-
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harms endured by the affected individuals with powerful nar-
ratives about their relationships and families.118 The courts did 
not follow the usual formalistic rules about tiers of review, but 
neither did they follow an “all bets against it” form of rational 
basis.119 They did not treat equal protection irrationality—
which asks whether the law discriminates on a rational basis—
distinctly from substantive due process irrationality—which 
asks whether the law as designed serves legitimate public 
ends.120 The tests and the irrationality they police intersected.121  
Justice Anthony Kennedy has been at the forefront of this 
hybrid, fluid approach to due process,122 and has been met with 
stinging criticism from fellow justices.123 Yet the very ambiguity 
 
grade or demean” under Fifth Amendment due process); see also Carpenter, 
supra note 107 (discussing the role of animus); Daniel Farber & Suzanna 
Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 258 (1996) (saying 
that the government cannot designate any societal group as “untouchable”). 
 118. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–90; see also 
Baskin, 766 F.3d at 658–59. 
 119. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). 
 120. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 121. In the case of challenges to irrationality of federal laws, the intersec-
tion of equal protection and substantive due process rationality is textually 
inescapable: the cases are based on the Fifth Amendment, which lacks an 
Equal Protection Clause. Equal protection irrationality can only be due pro-
cess irrationality. In our view, however, whenever government—federal or 
state—draws lines in utterly arbitrary and irrational ways, it violates baseline 
substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, respec-
tively. See infra Part IV.C. 
 122. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584 (applying equal protection and due pro-
cess as intersecting rights, without expressly naming any specific tier of re-
view); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (declining to specify a level of scrutiny). 
 123. The dissents in Obergefell were exceptionally harsh. See, e.g., 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing the major-
ity opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy, as “an act of will, not of legal judg-
ment”); id. at 2630, 2630 n.22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing Kennedy’s 
opinion as “couched in a style that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic,” 
and “profoundly incoherent;” complaining further, “[i]f, even as the price to be 
paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opinion for the Court that began [as the 
majority did], I would hide my head in a bag”); see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 223–24 (discussing the cases that were critical of Roe v. Wade). For 
insightful analyses of the Kennedy approach and its doctrinal implications, see 
Carpenter, supra note 107; Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: 
The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817 (2014) (describing 
the “jurisprudential implications of [the] intertwining of due process and equal 
protection in the context of same-sex marriage”); Heather K. Gerken, Wind-
sor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears of Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. 
REV. 587 (2015) (describing the “mad genius” of Windsor); Russell K. Robin-
son, Unequal Protection, 67 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (analyzing how 
Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor added to the growing changes in the equal pro-
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and fluidity of the test used in these cases allowed step-by-step 
progress that now has precipitated a cascade of liberty for 
same-sex couples. Regardless of whether one favors that cas-
cade one must acknowledge that due process and equal protec-
tion floors were essential to this decades-long legal evolution 
and expansion of liberty. 
The gay rights victories may be the most obvious modern 
examples of use of the rational basis test to root out irrationali-
ty, but they are not alone. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examin-
ers of New Mexico, the Court found that the State of New Mexi-
co could not deprive a law school graduate of the opportunity to 
sit for the bar exam based on neither the bar applicant’s past 
arrests (without convictions) or his affiliation with the Com-
munist Party.124 In other words, the popular morality of the 
state at the time was not sufficient justification to deny 
Schware a privilege that he objectively deserved as much as 
any other applicant. And, years later, the Supreme Court used 
something akin to rational basis review to invalidate a Texas 
law that denied public education to undocumented immigrant 
school children.125 
Some recent cases have even used the irrationality test to 
successfully challenge classic economic regulation—the zone in 
which judges are most loathe to deploy substantive due process 
as a meaningful check on government power.126 This shift to-
 
tection analysis). 
 124. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 246–47 (1957). 
 125. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226–30 (1982). For a rich discussion of 
Plyler and its seeming conflict with other education cases, see Robert C. Far-
rell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 382–87 (1999). 
 126. See, e.g., St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 218, 226–27 (5th 
Cir. 2013) (striking down a portion of a Louisiana regulatory scheme granting 
funeral homes the exclusive rights to sell caskets on substantive due process 
grounds), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 423 (2013) (mem.); Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 
F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (striking down an economically advantageous 
licensing scheme for pest controllers based on equal protection rational basis 
scrutiny); Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[P]rotecting 
a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate gov-
ernment purpose.”); Brantley v. Kuntz, No. A-13-CA-872-SS, 2015 WL 75244, 
at *8 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2015) (striking down state regulations applied to Afri-
can hair braiders as irrational under substantive due process); see also Timo-
thy Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why Yesterday’s 
Rationality Review Isn’t Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 457 (2004) (arguing for 
more meaningful review of economic regulation). But see Powers v. Harris, 379 
F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding an economically advantageous licensing 
scheme), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005). 
These cases are slowly accumulating evidence of the successful arguments 
by scholars who have long favored greater protection of socioeconomic rights. 
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ward treating liberty of property and contract as equivalent to 
other, more personal liberties has not escaped attention from 
academics,127 and may offer significant future grist for the ra-
tional basis mill as well as powerful reasons to favor the test’s 
modesty versus its stricter scrutiny cousins. 
For example, plaintiffs recently challenged a rule issued by 
the Louisiana Board of Funeral Directors that granted funeral 
homes an exclusive right to sell caskets.128 An abbey of the Ben-
edictine Order of the Catholic Church argued that the rule was 
irrational and thus an unconstitutional denial of due process 
and equal protection.129 Mirable dictu, they won. 
Writing for the panel, Judge Higginbotham noted that Lou-
isiana “does not regulate the use of a casket, container, or other 
enclosure for the burial remains; has no requirements for the 
construction or design of caskets; and does not require that 
caskets be sealed.”130 In fact, Louisiana law does not even re-
quire that a person be buried in a casket.131 Yet the state im-
posed significant regulatory restrictions on the sale of caskets, 
which prevented an abbey in the state from selling caskets at 
prices much lower than those sold by funeral homes.132 
The court recognized the broad deference owed to the gov-
ernment, post-Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.133 
States may justify laws based on a desire to protect a discrete 
industry, provided that “protection of the industry can be 
linked to advancement of the public interest or general wel-
fare.”134 By itself, however, economic protection of a particular 
 
See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRE-
SUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); BERNSTEIN, supra note 10; RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR 
LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014); MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CON-
STITUTION (2012). For a review of this work and its implications see Suzanna 
Sherry, Property Is the New Privacy: The Coming Constitutional Revolution, 
128 HARV. L. REV. 1452, 1475 (2015) [hereinafter Sherry, Privacy] (describing 
the momentum of the movement that treats much governmental regulation as 
a massive wealth transfer and warning, “If liberal legal academics continue to 
assume the legitimacy of the New Deal and dismiss contrary conservative the-
ory as out of the mainstream, they will be marginalized while Epstein, Bar-
nett, and the others march unopposed all the way to the Supreme Court.”). 
 127. Sherry, Privacy, supra note 126 (noting this shift and joining those 
who have warned of its potential power, if unopposed). 
 128. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 37:831(37)–(39), 37:848 (2007). 
 129. Castille, 712 F.3d. at 220. 
 130. Id. at 217. 
 131. Id. at 218.  
 132. Id.  
 133. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 134. Castille, 712 F.3d at 222. 
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industry may not suffice. It may be legitimate if it can be “sup-
ported by a post hoc perceived rationale as in Williamson,”135 
but it cannot be a “naked transfer of wealth.”136  
The Court further stated that “although rational basis re-
view places no affirmative evidentiary burden on the govern-
ment, plaintiffs may nonetheless negate a seemingly plausible 
basis for the law by adducing evidence of irrationality.”137 This 
rationale may be post hoc, but it may not be “fantasy,” and the 
link between the means and the plausible public end must be 
plausible as well.138 Applying this “fantasy” test the Court con-
cluded that no sufficient link existed between the post hoc hy-
pothesis of a consumer protection rationale for the law and the 
exclusive right of sale to funeral homes.139 Nor was there a ra-
tional relationship between the asserted public health and safe-
ty justification and the Louisiana law.140 It was nothing more 
than a brazen rent extraction carried out with the legislature’s 
help. 
Anticipating objections that the court’s decision could ush-
er in another era of Lochnerism,141 Judge Higginbotham noted 
that “[w]e deploy no economic theory of social statics or draw 
upon a judicial vision of free enterprise . . . .We insist only that 
Louisiana’s regulation not be irrational—the outer-most limits 
of due process and equal protection . . . .”142 
The few economic rights cases that succeed under the irra-
 
 135. Id. at 223 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Consti-
tution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 223.  
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 226–27. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See infra Part V.A (discussing critiques of the irrationality and outra-
geousness tests). 
 142. Castille, 712 F.3d at 227; see also Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 
224 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[P]rotecting a discrete interest group from economic com-
petition is not a legitimate government purpose.”); Brianne J. Gorod, Does 
Lochner Live?: The Disturbing Implications of Craigmiles v. Giles, 21 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 537, 538 (2003) (critiquing the case); cf. Heffner v. Murphy, 745 
F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding a law regulating funeral homes challenged 
on various constitutional grounds, including substantive due process, and ar-
guing that out of date facts may render a law irrational), cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 220 (2014) (mem.). But see Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 
2004) (viewing economic protectionism as rational under equal protection); cf. 
Bonner v. City of Brighton, 848 N.W.2d 380 (Mich. 2014) (noting that substan-
tive due process requires that a zoning ordinance advance a reasonable gov-
ernment interest, and may not make exclusions that are purely arbitrary and 
capricious). 
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tionality test do so for the same reason that many of the more 
personal rights cases succeed. They reinforce the notion, articu-
lated by Richard S. Kay, that “legislation based only on favorit-
ism or on spite is outside the scope of proper governmental ac-
tivity.”143 Thus, when lawmakers have used their authority for 
purposes that have no objective relationship to public welfare 
the rational basis challenge remains one option in the litigant 
toolbox. Still, like the outrageousness test, the irrationality test 
is a constitutional argument of last resort. It rarely produces 
victories. For those who fear erosion of New Deal era principles, 
this is its most attractive feature, especially if the shift toward 
expanding socioeconomic liberties continues. We favor preserv-
ing this modesty, while also favoring the preservation of a last 
resort check on government craziness, capture, and cruelty. 
III.  OUTRAGEOUS AND IRRATIONAL   
The irrationality and outrageousness tests both mark con-
stitutional floors—bare minimum standards to which the gov-
ernment must hold itself. The two tests have enough differ-
ences in the language and analysis typically used by courts to 
merit independent treatment of them throughout this Article. 
But they are close relatives. The two groups of cases overlap in 
large, overlooked respects worth underscoring. In particular, 
the outrageousness test sometimes applies something that 
looks more like a check for irrational decision-making to execu-
tive acts when those acts incorporate some form of government 
deliberation. Also, the tests share a textual root and core con-
cern about government acting arbitrarily and without reason. 
At bottom, both tests function as checks against abuses of 
power. Because the nature of each institution’s power differs, 
so, too, do the floor tests. Federal and local executive power is 
usually asserted through the myriad actions of their individual 
agents, and thus the alleged abuses are better suited to the 
shocks-the-conscience test. When legislatures abuse their pow-
er, in contrast, they lack a single conscience that can be meas-
ured against a minimum threshold of decency. Instead, legisla-
tors abuse their power by permitting the democratic process to 
be corrupted by political favoritism.  
But the outrageousness and irrationality tests are better 
conceived as two instantiations of a single quest to ferret out 
abuses of power. The particulars of the government actor and 
 
 143. Richard S. Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court 
1873–1903, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 667, 696 (1980). 
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the power abused should determine which test applies or 
whether the separation is even necessary.144 Indeed, Supreme 
Court precedent has shown sensitivity to context and has 
avoided creating rigid divisions between the two floor tests.  
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis,145 for example, the Court 
held that the standard of police officer culpability in a high-
speed pursuit scenario was whether the officer’s behavior was 
“arbitrary in the constitutional sense,” emphasizing that police 
must make extremely rapid decisions in life-threatening situa-
tions.146 But the Court also insisted that a less deferential test 
of executive misconduct might apply “when actual deliberation 
is practical.”147 In these other, less dynamic contexts, courts 
may have the freedom to scrutinize and sanction irrational be-
havior and not merely shocking conduct. For example, the ra-
tional basis test has been used in land use cases to review mu-
nicipal executive conduct that is “arbitrary, irrational, or 
tainted by improper motive.”148 This standard, and not the 
stricter conscience-shocking standard, governed these land use 
determinations despite the fact that the conduct at issue was 
executive rather than legislative.149  
 
 144. In some respects, the floor tests explored here are quite unremarka-
ble. Other relatively weak constitutional constraints on government abound: 
the rationality test within Commerce Clause doctrine (see, e.g., United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556–57, 559 (1995) (reaffirming the judicial power to 
assure a rational basis exists for congressional decision that regulatory activi-
ty substantially affects interstate commerce); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 281 (1981) (quoting United States v. 
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942))); the deferential test applied 
to judicial challenges of non-discriminatory state regulation that burdens in-
terstate commerce (see, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 
(1981) (holding that a deferential test was not satisfied and that the state law 
at issue impermissibly burdened interstate commerce)); and the judicial defer-
ence to administrative agencies’ reading of a statute that the agency is 
charged with administering (see, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to 
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step 
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006)). 
 145. 523 U.S. 833 (1998). 
 146. Id. at 846 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 
(1992)). 
 147. Id. at 851; see, e.g., Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 99–100 (1st Cir. 
2001) (holding that the court did not err in declining to give a “shocks the con-
science” jury instruction when mental patient was involuntarily committed 
and alleged officials failed to intervene when he was subjected to repeated 
punching; mental health worker here was subject to a more exacting standard 
than a prison guard reacting to a riot or a police in high speed pursuit of a 
suspect). 
 148. E.g., Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 149. For this reason, the panel in United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. 
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In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court invali-
dated an excessive punitive damage award using a blend of the 
outrageousness and irrationality tests.150 The Court struck the 
Alabama court’s award for entering “a zone of arbitrariness” 
that could not be justified by the harm that the defendant 
caused.151 This has the veneer of a rational basis test since the 
punitive damage award offended a shared sense of proportion-
ality and rational decision-making. On the other hand, the 
opinion accused the Alabama courts of inflicting a “grossly ex-
cessive” penalty, and of “imposing its regulatory policies on an 
entire Nation.”152 These passages, plus the Court’s references to 
specific facts related to the case, are more analogous to the out-
rageousness test because they focus on the Alabama courts’ ac-
tions in a particular, rather than systemic, way. Perhaps this 
makes a good deal of sense in the context of a challenge to a 
state court award. Judicial decisions are simultaneously specif-
ic and general because they resolve individual cases and create 
precedent. Thus, the outcomes of cases are analogous to the ac-
tions of an agent in a particular moment and to the actions of a 
legislature setting system-wide rules. Both due process floor 
tests should apply. 
Again, the floor tests are not wholly distinct or mutually 
exclusive creatures. But to crystallize the issues, we will often 
treat the two tests separately. What we lose in nuance by ana-
lyzing the tests as more distinct than they truly are we gain by 
clarifying their different trajectories and critiques. Still, we en-
courage readers not to lose track of the insight that the tests 
spring from a common constitutional well. In the following sec-
tions we describe the confusion over these tests, the scorn they 
elicit, and the many virtues of them that these criticisms ig-
nore. 
 
Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 401 (3d Cir. 2003), erred. The panel, 
which included Samuel Alito, held that the “shocks the conscience” test ap-
plied to executive conduct in a municipal land use dispute. For a persuasive 
critique of the case, see Clifford B. Levine & L. Jason Blake, United Artists: 
Reviewing the Conscience Shocking Test under Section 1983, 1 SETON HALL 
CIR. REV. 101 (2005) (critiquing United Artists and arguing that the conscience 
shocking test should apply only in cases of non-deliberative government con-
texts, not in land use settings in which executive officials have greater deci-
sion making time and deliberative structures). 
 150. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 151. Id. at 568; see also id. at 580–81 (applying a ratio between actual 
harm and assessed punitive damages). 
 152. Id. at 585. 
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IV.  CONFUSION   
The outrageousness and irrationality tests easily confuse 
courts not only because their respective standards are amor-
phous, but also because the division between them and cases 
that involve due process fundamental rights and elevated equal 
protection scrutiny is muddled. Misconceptions about the floor 
tests come in three forms.  
First, courts occasionally inject confusion into the prece-
dent by maintaining that the Due Process Clauses provide only 
procedural protections rather than substantive promises. As a 
normative matter, this debate is still live, but as a descriptive 
matter this is plainly incorrect.  
Second, and more commonly, some courts have suggested 
that substantive due process only protects fundamental rights. 
These courts insist inappropriately on an initial showing that 
the claimant’s fundamental rights were violated before apply-
ing one of the floor tests.  
Third, the Supreme Court itself has introduced impenetra-
ble confusion into the doctrine by ruling in Graham v. Connor153 
that courts should avoid considering substantive due process 
outrageousness claims if the action is plausibly covered by any 
other enumerated or fundamental constitutional right. The 
spirit of this case was meant to reinforce judicial restraint by 
ensuring that substantive due process protections are kept 
thin. But the actual mandate established by the case is so 
flawed that courts (including at times the Supreme Court itself) 
have refused to follow it faithfully.  
We consider each of these sources of confusion in order. 
A. DUE PROCESS IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY PROCEDURAL 
The phrase “due process” could suggest that the constitu-
tional protection affords only procedural rights—rights to have 
a meaningful opportunity to challenge a government action 
without any guarantees as to one’s success. Many distinguished 
commentators and jurists believe this is the better textual and 
historical view.154 
 
 153. 490 U.S. 386, 395–96 (1989). 
 154. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITI-
CAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31 (1990) (calling it a “momentous sham”); JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 
(1980) (describing it as a “contradiction in terms”); Nelson Lund, Federalism 
and Civil Liberties, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045, 1059 (1997) (stating that neither 
the text nor the intentions of the Framers supports substantive due process); 
see also Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (de-
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This, of course, is not the law. The modern Due Process 
Clauses plainly protect substantive rights any time they are 
used to enforce enumerated or fundamental rights.155 They also 
protect against substantively arbitrary and irrational and out-
rageous government conduct,156 not merely deprivations that 
violate process rights.157 Finally, due process has been con-
strued to also embrace a right to equal protection under the 
Fifth Amendment.158 
B. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS PROTECTS MORE THAN 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
Substantive due process protects fundamental and non-
fundamental liberties.159 Fundamental rights often receive the 
most attention because they trigger elevated scrutiny, and 
therefore vest more power in the courts.160 Within the category 
of fundamental rights are two sub-types of rights: those derived 
from enumerated rights set forth in the Bill of Rights and selec-
tively “incorporated” into the Fourteenth Amendment and 
 
scribing substantive due process as an “oxymoron”). The current Court has 
two substantive due process deniers in Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, 
who have insisted that due process should only protect procedural and not 
substantive rights. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 806 (2010) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part) (arguing that the Second Amendment applies 
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privilege and Immunities 
Clause, not its Due Process Clause); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I reject the proposition that the Due Process 
Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties, rather than merely guaran-
tees certain procedures as a prerequisite to deprivation of liberty.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–86 (1965) (ex-
plaining that a law affecting a married couple’s ability to use birth control im-
plicates the Due Process Clause).  
 156. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 834 (1998) (“[O]nly 
the most egregious official conduct can be said to be ‘arbitrary’ in the constitu-
tional sense.” (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 
(1992))). 
 157. Indeed, these two concepts are interdependent, in ways that often 
make any effort to draw bright-line borders between them futile. See 
SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 97, at 168. 
 158. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); see SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 97, at 
159–66; David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and 
Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253, 1261 (2005); Richard A. Primus, Bolling 
Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 975 (2004); cf. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 
312, 332 (1921) (noting that due process “tends to secure equality of law in the 
sense that it makes a required minimum of protection for every one’s right of 
life, liberty and property”).  
 159. SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 97, at 158. 
 160. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. 473 U.S. 432, 440 
(1985) (describing fundamental rights that initiate elevated scrutiny). 
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“unenumerated” rights deemed to be fundamental to ordered 
liberty.161 Of these, unenumerated fundamental rights have 
sparked the most heated criticism, especially reproductive 
rights and sexual autonomy-related rights.  
Nearly all of the first eight amendments have been deemed 
to be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.162 Only the 
Third and Seventh Amendments have escaped incorporation.163 
Thus, most of the specific constitutional rights that can be as-
serted against the states—such as freedom of speech or protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures—are due pro-
cess-based rights.164 The Court also has stated that when rights 
from the Bill of Rights are incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment, they usually must be given the same meaning as 
they have in the Bill of Rights.165 An asymmetrical reading 
must be justified.166 Therefore, the case law that defines free-
dom of speech under the First Amendment applies equally to 
freedom of speech under the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause, and it is not uncommon for courts to describe 
such a claim against the state as a First Amendment claim 
even though it is technically a due process claim.167 
Some courts believe that the only other rights that the Due 
Process Clauses protect are fundamental rights that receive 
heightened scrutiny.168 However, the fact that an asserted liber-
ty interest lacks fundamental right status does not mean it is 
nonexistent. Instead, it means it triggers only rational basis re-
view, with a strong presumption in favor of government.169 
Some discussions of substantive due process miss this point 
and treat all substantive due process cases as requiring at the 
 
 161. SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 97, at 159. 
 162. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 n.12 (2010).  
 163. Id. at 744 n.13. 
 164. See id. at 744. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. at 744. 
 167. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664–66 (1925).  
 168. Ill. Psychological Ass’n v. Falk, 818 F.2d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(calling substantive due process a “durable oxymoron” and suggesting that it 
offers protection limited only to fundamental rights). 
 169. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 
(1955) (holding that a regulation forbidding opticians from fitting and dupli-
cating eyeglasses had some rational relation to a legitimate government objec-
tive and therefore was constitutional); United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 
U.S. 144, 153 (1938) (“Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation 
whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of 
judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry 
. . . .”). 
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outset the identification of a fundamental or enumerated 
right.170  
Courts, too, have confused the liberty right of freedom from 
outrageous or irrational conduct with the due process principle 
that government behavior must burden a right that is “deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” which is the 
standard to gain fundamental right status and trigger elevated 
scrutiny.171 This is a high standard to meet, for good reason—
courts are reluctant to identify too many fundamental-but-
unexpressed constitutional rights within the court’s control.  
Courts that require litigants to first prove that a funda-
mental right was violated in order to make use of the outra-
geousness or irrationality test, however, are confused. Funda-
mental rights do not exhaust substantive due process 
protections. The weak outrageousness and rational basis 
brakes apply to fundamental and non-fundamental rights.172 
They are interstitial due process protections. The floor tests are 
best seen as a constitutional protection from the very worst 
forms of executive abuse of authority, and they can be used in-
dependently or in combination with other constitutional rights. 
The outrageousness test, for example, applies only when the 
 
 170. See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 
F.3d 804, 816–17 (11th Cir. 2004) (construing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), as failing to establish a fundamental right relevant to adoption and 
suggesting that fundamental rights provide the only route to a substantive 
due process victory); MFS, Inc. v. Dilazaro, 771 F. Supp. 2d 382, 439–45 (E.D. 
Pa. 2011) (describing steps and concluding that government conduct did not 
shock the conscience in land use approval case); Steven G. Calabresi, Substan-
tive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1539 
(2008) (criticizing Lawrence for protecting rights through substantive due pro-
cess that are not deeply rooted in history and tradition). 
 171. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (noting that a 
party alleging a violation of substantive due process must include a “careful 
description” of the asserted fundamental liberty interest, and must establish 
that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed” (citing Reno 
v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 
(1937))). 
 172. See SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 97, at 130–34, 154 (providing 
background on the development of the rational basis test and its application to 
non-fundamental rights and explaining that “substantive due process also 
constrains executive power, and arguably imposes a rationality limitation on 
the exercise of that power”). This does not mean, however, that the relative 
importance of the liberty interest at stake is irrelevant. A court’s assessment 
of what is constitutionally outrageous or irrational is inevitably dependent up-
on the significance or weight of the liberty interest affected. But if only fun-
damental liberty interests—so identified by the courts—triggered even ration-
al basis scrutiny, then the rational basis test would be superfluous: 
fundamental liberty interests trigger elevated scrutiny, by definition.  
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executive misconduct is intentional, deliberate,173 and con-
science shocking. It applies even if no other recognized right 
has been violated. Thus, there is no reason that a litigant 
should have to claim that the infringed liberty interest is “fun-
damental” before tapping into one of the floor tests. A denial of 
rational or non-outrageous treatment is itself a deprivation of a 
due process liberty. Stripped to its essentials, due process’s “an-
imating commitment . . . . is captured by perhaps the most per-
sistently recurring theme in due process cases: government 
must not be arbitrary.”174  
Seeing this distinction, and recognizing that fundamental 
rights and their so-called “strict scrutiny” define only one par-
cel of the substantive due process territory, becomes crucial 
here. There also are rationality floors, and not just fundamen-
tal rights silos with their strict scrutiny fortification.175  
These two types of substantive rights—baseline rationality 
expectations and higher, fundamental rights and suspect clas-
sification expectations—provide a useful framework for under-
standing the due process and equal protection case law as a 
whole. In truth, however, the fundamental/non-fundamental 
rights dichotomy is not perfectly descriptively accurate. Sub-
stantive due process cases exist on a continuum, just like pro-
cedural due process cases.176 Sliding scales of review often tend 
to overtake clean categorical divisions in areas where the law 
 
 173. See, e.g., Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 210 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(noting that “[t]he state of mind of a government defendant is an integral as-
pect of any ‘shock the conscience’ standard” and requires more than negli-
gence); People v. Uribe, 199 Cal. App. 4th 836, 862 (2011) (finding that tradi-
tionally substantive due process is applied to deliberate action in order to 
prevent oppressive and arbitrary government action). 
 174. Fallon, supra note 86, at 322–23. For this reason, among others, we 
treat equal protection arbitrariness as a sub-species of due process irrationali-
ty. 
 175. See SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 97, at 166 (“Due process today 
is part of an astounding mosaic of reconceived constitutional rights, rights 
that are best read as reconstitutive and interdependent rather than as silos of 
protection, narrowly understood.”). 
 176. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); see also Justice 
Frankfurter’s express view to this effect about substantive due process, infra 
note 282. Equal protection cases also lie on a continuum, for reasons articulat-
ed by Justice Stevens, among others. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally An-
drew M. Siegel, Equal Protection Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and 
the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2339 (2006) (providing background on applications of the Equal Protection 
Clause and arguing that the Supreme Court should apply the Equal Protec-
tion Clause without any mediating doctrines, pursuant to Justice Stevens’ 
concurrence in Craig v. Boren, 492 U.S. 190, 211–14 (1976)).  
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must cover a broad landscape, and this is no less true of sub-
stantive due process.177  
The sexual orientation cases are good examples of cases 
that now inhabit a space between the traditional bare mini-
mum promised by the rational basis test and the heightened 
protections offered to fundamental rights and suspect classes.178 
Adding to the doctrinal muddiness is that the gay rights cases 
drew heavily on both equal protection-styled arguments about 
arbitrariness and animus and connections to previously recog-
nized fundamental interests in sexual privacy and marriage. 
But even the successful gay rights challenges were treated with 
the same rhetorical skepticism that characterizes all rational 
basis challenges. 
The legacy of Lawrence v. Texas179 is instructive. When the 
Fifth Circuit was asked to consider whether a Texas ban on the 
provision (even for free) of sex toys violated its residents’ sub-
stantive due process rights, the court avoided having to answer 
the question of whether private sexual activities in the home 
were protected fundamental rights.180 Because of Lawrence, the 
court didn’t feel it needed to decide whether the plaintiffs chal-
lenging the sex toy ban concerned a fundamental right because 
the only defense the government could muster was that the ban 
furthered a state interest in general “public morality.”181 Alt-
hough the court didn’t say so, it was able to avoid the funda-
mental rights question because it could, and did, apply the def-
erential rational basis test from Lawrence and rule against the 
government. 
More generally, the floor cases are good vehicles for seeing 
the complexities in constitutional law more clearly and accu-
rately, precisely because at times they evade a simple, broad-
brush formula. Efforts to impose some order on this vast due 
 
 177. For an enduringly insightful analysis of the many reasons why sub-
stantive due process “defies reduction to any elegant set of controlling sub-
stantive principles,” see Fallon, supra note 86, at 322. 
 178. They also resemble other equal protection cases that are suspect class 
and fundamental rights “near misses” and thus receive a form of intermediate 
scrutiny. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442, 448 (holding that mental-
ly disabled is not a quasi-suspect class calling for a heightened standard of re-
view, but also holding that a zoning ordinance requiring a group home for 
mentally disabled patients to obtain a special use permit bears no rational ba-
sis to a legitimate government interest and therefore violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause).  
 179. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 180. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 743–44 (5th Cir. 
2008). 
 181. Id. at 745. 
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process terrain will always be difficult. We recognize that the 
complex system of due process review is flattened to some ex-
tent by our rough classifications of due process floor cases182 
and we will explicitly address the need for higher standards of 
review in appropriate cases.183 But to make some sense of exist-
ing doctrine and to explore its potential, we will treat substan-
tive due process as consisting of both fundamental rights cases 
and—of particular importance to us—the floor cases. 
C. DUE PROCESS IRRATIONALITY AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
IRRATIONALITY ARE CLOSE COUSINS 
Challenges to irrational laws have used both the Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses for their constitutional 
source. A distinction can be drawn between them: Equal Pro-
tection looks for differences in treatment to different groups of 
people while substantive due process tests the substance of the 
law.184 But this distinction is mostly illusory. Just about every 
 
 182. We are mindful of the powerful body of scholarship that debates the 
pros and cons of abandoning tiers and allowing unmediated application of con-
stitutional provisions. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 
1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 
88–90 (1997) (analyzing the suspect and non-suspect classification tests for 
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equali-
ty Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 482–84 (2004) (contending that a sin-
gle standard should replace the tiered approach to applying the Equal Protec-
tion Clause); Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered 
Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 993 (2004) (supporting tiered scrutiny for 
Equal Protection application); Jeffrey M. Shamann, Cracks in the Structure: 
The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 163 
(1984) (arguing that tiered scrutiny will collapse); Cass R. Sunstein, The Su-
preme Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 7–10 (1996) (supporting a minimalist approach to applying the Equal 
Protection Clause); cf. Peter Brandon Bayer, Rationality—and the Irrational 
Underinclusiveness of the Civil Rights Laws, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1988) 
(discussing the interrelationship between choosing a tier of review and balanc-
ing the relevant normative concerns). 
 183. See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, Of Tiers of Scrutiny and Time Travel: A 
Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 CAL. L. REV. 819, 821 (2002) (noting that nomen-
clature matters, and calling something that is “evil” a “mere inconvenience” 
may result). 
 184. The classic statement explaining this comes from Justice Jackson, in 
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York:  
Invalidation of a statute or an ordinance on due process grounds 
leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct which many people find 
objectionable.  
  Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand, does 
not disable any government body from dealing with the subject at 
hand. It merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a 
broader impact. . . . [T]here is no more effective practical guaranty 
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that 
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legislative action involves line drawing, and those lines create 
boundaries between subsets of people who will be differentially 
affected by the law. Those group distinctions often affect the 
law’s fairness and rationality as much as the substance. In-
deed, challenges to the substance of a law are usually insepa-
rable from considerations of who bears its effects, so courts and 
scholars alike have treated them as functionally identical.185 As 
the Court recently emphasized, equal protection and due pro-
cess are “connected in a profound way, though they set forth 
different principles. . . . [I]n some instances each may be in-
structive as to the meaning and reach of each other.”186 
More fundamentally, liberty and equality are doctrinally 
entwined because there is no separate Equal Protection Clause 
to constrain the federal government as there is to bind the 
states.187 Equality only binds the federal government through 
judicial interpretations of the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause and its dynamic relationship to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.188 That is, the type of arbitrariness that offends 
 
the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority be 
imposed generally.  
336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 185. See, e.g, Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 157 F.3d 819, 822 
n.2 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he rational basis inquiry is the same for equal protec-
tion and substantive due process challenges to zoning.” (quoting Restigouche, 
Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1214 n.6 (11th Cir. 1995))); Georgia 
Manufactured Hous. Ass’n v. Spalding County, 148 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 
1998); Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 6085, 2008 WL 182248, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 16, 2008) (“[T]he rational basis test under substantive due process is 
identical to the rational basis test under equal protection.”); Anthony B. Sand-
ers, Exhumation Through Burial: How Challenging Casket Regulations 
Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 
MINN. L. REV. 668, 674 (2004); cf. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20–24 (1972) (examining Justice Jackson’s concur-
rence in Railway Express Agency but explaining that “due process, like equal 
protection, also purports to impose a requirement of minimally rational 
means-ends relationship”). 
 186. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015). The Court contin-
ued, “[i]n any particular case one [c]lause may be thought to capture the es-
sence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two 
clauses converge in the identification and definition of that right.” Id. 
 187. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (“The liberty 
protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains within it the 
prohibition against denying to any person equal protection of the laws.”). 
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or [shall any person] be deprived life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV § 1 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”). 
 188. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954); see also Windsor, 133 
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our sense of equal treatment is judicially traced back to the due 
process artery in cases that involve federal authority, in a form 
of reverse incorporation.189 Inequality thus is a due process lib-
erty problem, as a matter of current constitutional grammar.  
To take just one example, the Supreme Court recently reit-
erated that tax measures that make distinctions among tax-
payers trigger rational basis review under equal protection.190 
The Court recognized that this is an extremely easy test for the 
government to satisfy,191 but in dissent, Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Scalia and Alito thought that the rational basis 
floor had been breached.192 The case happened to involve a mu-
nicipal tax code.193 Had a similar tax distinction been drawn by 
the Internal Revenue Service instead of a municipality, the 
Court would have had to analyze the distinction under the 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, not the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet the ra-
tional basis analysis would have proceeded in precisely the 
same way.194 
Thus, we lose little by treating due process and equal pro-
tection irrationality as two star pieces in a single constitutional 
floor protection.  
D. OUTRAGEOUSNESS AS A LAST RESORT 
The most significant doctrinal obstacle to outrageousness 
claims is an obscure principle derived from Graham v. Con-
 
S. Ct. at 2695 (“While the Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Govern-
ment the power to degrade or demean in the way this law does, the equal pro-
tection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amend-
ment right all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved.”). 
 189. For an extended discussion of the “reverse incorporation” history, see 
SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 97, at 159–66. 
 190. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2077 (2012); cf. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985) (noting that in-state preference 
to home state insurance companies would violate equal protection rationality). 
 191. Armour, 132 S. Ct. at 2080–81; see also Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of 
Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 107–08 (2003) (describing the low threshold that a 
tax law must meet to satisfy the rational-basis test); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 
312, 319–20 (1993) (noting the increased deference given to governments un-
der rational-basis review); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) 
(per curiam) (“States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local 
economies.”). 
 192. Armour, 132 S. Ct. at 2087 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. at 2078 (majority opinion). 
 194. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 789–90 (2010) (dis-
cussing the presumption in favor of symmetrical readings of constitutional 
limits on federal and state authorities). 
318 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:281 
 
nor.195 To the extent that the cases are tied to substantive due 
process rather than to a more explicit, textual source of protec-
tion, they violate an unevenly enforced constitutional principle 
that specific text should trump more general sources of consti-
tutional rights.196 Substantive due process, according to this 
view, should not be used as judicial filler to supplement places 
where the more specific text protections run out.197 Rather, 
“that [specific] Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 
substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these 
claims.”198  
But one need only consider the case of Graham to under-
stand that the process of looking for a fundamental or enumer-
ated right first and applying the outrageousness test second 
has to be wrong. In Graham, the Supreme Court decided that 
the outrageousness test articulated in Rochin cannot be in-
voked when a “more specific” constitutional right against the 
alleged improper behavior is available.199 Where one can “care-
fully describe” a specific constitutional right that may cover the 
alleged government misconduct, this more specific right in ef-
fect “preempts” a more diffuse substantive due process argu-
ment.200 So, at least in instances when the fundamental liberty 
interest is recognized in another part of the Constitution, the 
 
 195. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 196. Id. at 395–96. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 395. 
 199. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998); Albright v. 
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994); Graham, 490 U.S. at 395; see Michael J.Z. 
Mannheimer, Coerced Confessions and the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 57, 76–86 (2002); Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The 
Court’s “Jot for Jot” Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1086, 1086–87 (1998) (examining Graham’s holding and its effects).  
 200. The test has also been invoked as a limit on official culpability in cases 
involving familial association liberty. See generally Alberici v. City of Los An-
geles, No. 12-10511-JFW (VBKx), 2013 WL 5573045 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013). 
In other words, the test not only may form the basis of a substantive due pro-
cess right against shocking government conduct, but also may operate as a 
limit on official culpability for other substantive due process rights. In the lat-
ter cases, the analysis would have three steps: first, to determine if another 
substantive due process right exists; second, to determine if the right has been 
violated; and third, to determine if the official conduct that interfered with the 
right was conscience shocking. Such cases, however, only use the “shocks the 
conscience” benchmark to determine the applicable standard of care and scope 
of official immunity, not to define the underlying due process right itself. They 
also seem to regard conscience-shocking as an across-the-board test for execu-
tive misconduct such that even less egregious forms of executive arbitrariness, 
even in the realm of fundamental due process rights, cannot violate due pro-
cess. We regard this as a mistake. 
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lower courts in theory cannot combine that fundamental right 
with the outrageousness test. 
However, the rule expressed in Graham has only exacer-
bated the confusion in this area. Its rule is lamentable;201 its 
reasoning is unsound. It cannot be squared with the common 
practice of allowing multiple constitutional rights to be assert-
ed when the facts suggest they may be violated. Moreover, the 
Graham rule is heeded inconsistently, even by the Supreme 
Court. After all, Graham was decided in 1989, and many of the 
cases we have already described (including Lewis) were decided 
later and potentially could have been analyzed under a differ-
ent, more specific right.202 
Meanwhile, Graham has spawned some badly disoriented 
case law. In some cases, courts have added the outrageousness 
test to their analysis of other constitutional rights. That is, if a 
more specific constitutional right—say the First203 or the Fourth 
Amendment—covers the government misconduct, then execu-
tive officials (e.g. police) cannot be held accountable for the vio-
lation unless their conduct is conscience shocking. In these cas-
 
 201. See Massaro, supra note 199; see also Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and 
Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of 
Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 833 (2003) (offering a more sympathetic view 
of Graham, and construing the holding more narrowly to better fit it into sub-
stantive due process doctrine more generally). The good news is that the Court 
has not applied this “specific trumps general” account of substantive due pro-
cess as pervasively as it might have given the open-ended nature of the opin-
ion. The bad news is that the Court has not retreated altogether from this 
rule, with troubling implications. For a recent, compelling analysis of such 
worrisome implications in the abortion rights context, see Caitlin E. 
Borgmann, Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1047, 1047 (2014) (examining courts’ interpretation of the undue bur-
den standard). 
 202. See County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 845–46; Graham, 490 U.S. at 
386. 
 203. Say, for example, state officials detailed to protect the Governor en-
gaged in unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination in policing political 
expression. Citing safety concerns, state officials might place protestors in 
places far removed from sight or hearing whenever the Governor speaks in 
public, while allowing pro-Governor speakers to ring the public podium. It is 
one thing to say the officials might be sheltered from suit under qualified im-
munity. See, e.g., Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2014) (upholding quali-
fied immunity for Secret Service agents who moved protesters farther away 
from President Bush than Bush supporters). It is quite another thing to say 
that such conduct, if engaged in by state officials, is insulated unless it is con-
science shocking. Moreover, freedom of speech limits on states flow from sub-
stantive due process, not from the First Amendment directly. Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (discussing liberties protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment, including freedom of speech). 
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es, the Rochin test can strangle the constitutional rights that 
are supposed to be robust.204  
These cases ought to be ignored. Courts taking this ap-
proach are confused about what substantive due process covers: 
it includes all of the fundamental rights that apply to state ex-
ecutive officials through the incorporation doctrine, as well as 
the equal protection limits on federal executive officials that 
flow from the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the 
non-fundamental liberties that receive only rational basis re-
view. These are all “substantive due process” rights.205 Surely it 
cannot be that executive officials are incapable of violating the-
se rights absent conscience-shocking conduct. 
Even if all of these doctrinal errors were corrected, howev-
er, the outrageousness test would still have an exceedingly nar-
row scope and modest effect. A recent illustration of how diffi-
cult the test is to satisfy, even when properly invoked, is Zotos 
v. Town of Hingham, in which the federal district court noted 
that “in order to demonstrate conduct that shocks the con-
science, a plaintiff must present ‘stunning evidence’ of ‘arbitrar-
iness and caprice’ that extends beyond ‘[m]ere violations of 
state law, even violations resulting from bad faith’ to ‘some-
thing more egregious and more extreme.’”206 This is because the 
test is designed to be an option of last resort. A more liberal in-
terpretation of the test would conflict with its purpose.207 
Despite the caution that courts have taken before applying 
one of the substantive due process floor rules, they have both 
attracted outsized reactions from the judiciary. For reasons we 
explain next, the contempt is unwarranted. 
 
 204. For an insightful overview of these cases, see Rosalie Berger Levinson, 
Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due Process, 60 
FLA. L. REV. 519, 519 (2008) (arguing substantive due process should be a lim-
itation on abuses of executive power); cf. Levinson, supra note 16, at 308 (out-
lining perceived problems with applying only low level, shocks the conscience 
review of executive action). 
 205. For an exceptional analysis of the history of substantive due process 
see Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 
YALE L.J. 408, 411 (2010) (arguing that due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment had a widely accepted substantive component). 
 206. Zotos v. Town of Hingham, No. 12-11126-JGD, 2013 WL 5328478, at 
*12 (D. Mass. Sept. 19, 2013) (quoting DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 119 
(1st Cir. 2005)); see also Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 791 n.4 (6th Cir. 
1995) (describing the test as a “virtually insurmountable uphill struggle”). 
 207. S.M. v. Lakeland Sch. Dist., 148 F. Supp. 2d 542, 547–49 (M.D. Pa. 
2001) (holding that verbal abuse and humiliation of a public school student did 
not satisfy the shocks the conscience test and did not implicate a liberty inter-
est).  
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V.  SCORN   
Substantive due process law has sprawled since the ratifi-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment. At every moment, includ-
ing the moment of its rebirth in 1868, the doctrine has inspired 
controversy and scorn.  
The outrageousness and irrationality tests attract criticism 
related to the discretionary and unpredictable nature of the 
standards they apply. Each test also inspires criticism unique 
to its particular history and usage. We consider each in turn. 
A. CRITICISM OF THE OUTRAGEOUSNESS AND IRRATIONALITY  
TESTS 
The root of some objections to the outrageousness and irra-
tionality tests is profound skepticism about the substantive due 
process enterprise as a whole.208 The floor tests are even less 
understood and less legitimated by courts than are the forms of 
substantive due process that protect enumerated or fundamen-
tal rights, or the strands of equal protection that name suspect 
classifications. Thus, all the criticism that applies to substan-
tive due process generally applies to these floor tests as well, 
but with special vehemence. For example, scholars and jurists 
who regard due process as properly about only procedural due 
process are, naturally, dubious about all of the case law that 
imposes substantive due process limits on the states—
fundamental and non-fundamental rights, enumerated and 
unenumerated.209  
The concerns that motivate criticism for substantive due 
process writ large are applicable to some degree to the constitu-
tional floor tests.210 The criticisms center on the menaces of ju-
dicial discretion and power. Substantive due process suffers 
from a lack of interpretative guideposts, particularly with the 
floor tests.211 And the doctrine permits an arrogation of power to 
 
 208. See Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 209. Id.  
 210. Although David Bernstein has criticized the fundamental rights line 
of substantive due process cases for selecting certain types of individual rights 
for protection while giving economic liberties short shrift. BERNSTEIN, supra 
note 10. 
 211. Some scholars dislike judicial balancing tests generally. There is vast 
literature on the pros and cons of rules versus standards, and their judicial 
deployment. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPH-
ICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 
(1991) (arguing that following rules may lead to suboptimal outcomes because 
of under or over inclusion); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (examining how various factors influ-
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the judiciary that arguably belongs to other branches, and es-
pecially to the states.212 The outrageousness and irrationality 
tests can spawn new rights that impede the democratic will of 
legislatures, with the shared defects of atextualism, judicial ac-
tivism, and subjectivity. In a word, the fear is Lochner. 
In Lochner v. New York,213 the Supreme Court found that a 
New York labor statute prohibiting employees from working 
more than sixty hours per week violated employers’ and em-
ployees’ substantive due process rights to freely contract.214 The 
Court recognized that the state has broad police powers to re-
strict the freedom to contract for the safety and welfare of its 
citizens without any interference by the federal constitution.215 
So, the case can be characterized as a rational basis floor test,216 
although it is conceived by some as a precedent that estab-
lished, for a time, a fundamental right to make contracts.217 Re-
 
ence the creation and application of rules verses standards); Kathleen M. Sul-
livan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term: Foreword: The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 26 (1992) (looking at the Justices’ differing 
views on rules and standards).  
 212. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 520–22 (1965) (Black, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no provision of the Constitution which either ex-
pressly or impliedly vests power in this Court to sit as a supervisory agency 
over acts of duly constituted legislative bodies and set aside their laws because 
of the Court’s belief that the legislative policies adopted are unreasonable, 
unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irrational. The adoption of such a loose, flexi-
ble, uncontrolled standard for holding laws unconstitutional . . . will amount to 
a great unconstitutional shift of power to the courts which . . . will be bad for 
the courts and worse for the country. Subjecting federal and state laws to such 
an unrestrained and unrestrainable judicial control as to the wisdom of legis-
lative enactments would . . . jeopardize the separation of governmental powers 
that the Framers set up and at the same time, threaten to take away much of 
the power of States to govern themselves which the Constitution plainly in-
tended them to have.”); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2615–16 
(2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (condemning the majority opinion for recreat-
ing the mistake of Lochner by acting as a legislature rather than a court). 
 213. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 214. Id. at 53. 
 215. Id. at 53–54. 
 216. Indeed, the opinion takes great pains to describe a range of cases in 
which the Court held that the State’s interests in the safety and welfare of 
workers and third parties were sufficient to withstand the constitutional chal-
lenge to labor laws. Id. at 54–56. 
 217. The key reasoning language uses a mix of concepts we would find in 
both rational basis and heightened scrutiny. Id. at 57–58 (“There is no reason-
able ground for interfering with the liberty of [a] person or the right of free 
contract . . . we think that a law like the one before us involves neither the 
safety, the morals, nor the welfare of the public . . . . The mere assertion that 
the subject relates, though but in a remote degree, to the public health, does 
not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have a more direct 
relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and le-
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gardless of the Court’s intent, the opinion came to be under-
stood as a low point in the history of judicial restraint because 
it enticed judges to question the value of labor and economic 
regulations and to substitute their own policy judgments for 
that of the legislatures. 
Lochner has cast a long and menacing shadow over sub-
stantive due process ever since.218 Judicial scrutiny of govern-
ment action that affects socio-economic, non-fundamental 
rights still triggers Progressive anxieties about judicial thwart-
ing of worthy policy reform.219 Arguments against such scrutiny 
still cite the 1905 decision, despite its formal renunciation 60 
years ago, in 1955.220 Yet courts were not as aggressive during 
the Lochner era as they sometimes are described.221 Moreover, 
 
gitimate, before an act can be held to be valid which interferes with the gen-
eral right of an individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract 
in relation to his own labor.”). 
 218. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 10; see also Harrison, supra note 10 
(discussing in great detail the possible textual and historical justifications for 
substantive due process and concluding that there is no satisfactory link); 
Mandelker, supra note 10 (discussing Lochner’s “shadow” over substantive due 
process); Sunstein, supra note 10 (noting the effects of Lochner as “[ruling out] 
most forms of redistribution and paternalism”); cf. FISS, supra note 19, at 109 
(arguing that the Court in Lochner reinforced the wrong right); David A. 
Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong? 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 375 (2003) (arguing 
that the Lochner flaw was not its finding a right to contract, but its aggressive 
interpretation of that right). 
 219. This is even true when arguments proceed within the zone of funda-
mental, enumerated rights. For example, First Amendment scholars are cur-
rently debating the “Lochnerization” of freedom of expression. See Tim Wu, 
The Right To Evade Regulation, NEW REPUBLIC, June 3, 2013. This critique, 
however, is hardly new. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Jr., 
Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 8, 40 (1979) (arguing that the extension of free speech protection to 
commercial speech was a lamentable resurrection of Lochner-style economic 
due process); see also Mark Tushnet, Introduction: Reflections on the First 
Amendment and the Information Economy, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2234, 2248–50 
(2014) (discussing ways in which First Amendment doctrine is “business 
friendly” and how that may change in an information economy). 
 220. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 221. See Nourse, supra note 19, at 754 (claiming the standard Lochner nar-
rative ignores what Nourse has described as Lochner’s “double history” and 
defies the facts); id. at 757 (“[T]he claim that Lochner is politics does not rest 
upon the 1905 law of substantive due process, but on Teddy Roosevelt’s politi-
cal opposition to Lochner’s result. Today’s standard Lochner story is Roose-
velt’s story; it is not Justice Peckham’s majority story or Justice Harlan’s dis-
senting story.”); see also HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: 
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 4 
(1993) (discussing harms created when “activist judges turn away from im-
portant institutional norms and become more interested in making law than 
interpreting it”); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 421 (1995) (describing the story of Lochner’s 
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those who fear modern use of the rational basis test to strike 
down economic regulations may have lost sight of America’s 
complicated history with dubious economic regulations; the en-
forcement of importation rules and duties that filled the British 
coffers without offering any benefit to the colonies were regard-
ed as the sort of bald economic favoritism that tarnished the le-
gitimacy of British rule and inspired the Bill of Rights.222  
Whatever one may think of Lochner’s history, however, 
court seizure of vast power to second-guess economic regulation 
simply is not a realistic threat today. A generation of law schol-
ars and judges has been primed to see the perils of constitu-
tional review whenever it is not moored to a particular consti-
tutional right, with few taking notice of the caution and 
modesty that the courts have exhibited, or of the wide range of 
normatively appealing uses of such an “emergencies only” test. 
Use of the Lochner trope thus is a misleading way to de-
scribe substantive due process doctrine and its potential risks 
today, just as the Roe v. Wade223 trimester strict scrutiny trope 
is a misleading way to describe modern abortion rights and 
their potential downsides. Rightly or wrongly, the doctrinal im-
pact of both cases was checked almost immediately by subse-
quent opinions, though the restraining cases enjoy less popular 
name recognition and did little to curb the fears of those wary 
of judicial over-reaching.224  
Nevertheless, accusations of judicial indiscretion are a 
hearty perennial, and Lochner-inflected winds—both actual 
and rhetorical—often blow through them.225 The gay rights 
opinions described above triggered consternation from dissent-
ing judges, who demanded more formalism, less legal “argle-
 
constitutionalization of laissez-faire economic rights as “exaggerated at best” 
(citing Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Govern-
ment-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 
1863–1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970, 978–81 (1975))).  
 222. Stuntz, supra note 221, at 404–06. 
 223. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 224. For Lochner, the relevant case is Williamson, 348 U.S. at 483. For 
Roe, it is Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). But one 
rarely hears in legal scholarship “Viva Williamson v. Lee Optical!” Or, sees 
signs in front of the United States Supreme Court: “Overrule Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey Now!” 
 225. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). It is not just Lochner that sends a chill down some spines. The 
most notorious case in Supreme Court history—Dred Scott—also makes an 
appearance in debates as the ultimate example of grotesque judicial over-
reaching under the substantive due process banner. See id.; see also infra note 
246. 
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bargle”226 and “nonspecific hand-waving,”227 more careful articu-
lation of the precise due process and equal protection rights at 
stake, sharper analysis of the weirdness of using “animus” as a 
way of denouncing results of majoritarian processes (versus in-
dividual action),228 and greater emphasis on historical legal tra-
ditions that allowed government to regulate—even criminal-
ize—core aspects of sexuality and same-sex relations.229 They 
also were furious that the courts were “mistak[ing] a 
Kulturkampf for a fit of spite”230 and imposing the predilections 
of an elite, law-trained legal culture on the lay public.231 Some 
accused the courts of constitutionalizing outcomes in funda-
mental disputes about the nature of social institutions—
especially marriage—in ways that might precipitate long-term, 
adverse consequences for society as well as the judiciary.232  
 
 226. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2674, 2709 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).  
 227. Id. at 2707; see also supra note 123 (describing the exceptionally harsh 
criticisms of the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Scalia in Obergefell). 
 228. For articles that analyze the “animus” thread, see Carpenter, supra 
note 107; Daniel O. Conkle, Evolving Values, Animus, and Same-Sex Mar-
riage, 89 IND. L.J. 27, 29 (2014) (examining the Court’s reasoning in various 
cases to show a Fourteenth Amendment right to same-sex marriage); William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitu-
tional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2064 (2002) (ar-
guing that identity-based social movements influenced interpretations of 
rights in the twentieth century); Barbara J. Flagg, “Animus” and Moral Dis-
approval: A Comment on Romer v. Evans, 82 MINN. L. REV. 833, 833–35 (1998) 
(exploring the distinction between moral disapproval and animus); Susannah 
W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 887 (2012) 
(looking at Court precedence for a standard that can be used to identify ani-
mus).  
 229. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 230. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added). 
 231. Id. 
 232. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (asking “[j]ust who do we think we are?” of the majority for dis-
rupting traditional notions of marriage, and accusing it of violating democratic 
principles by doing so); id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting) (warning that the 
opinion may be used to vilify those who “are unwilling to assent to the new or-
thodoxy” and imposed its own view of marriage on the American people in 
ways that might cause “bitter and lasting wounds”); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 
2715–16 (Alito, J., dissenting) (expressing his concern that the Court was sub-
stituting a companionate theory of marriage over traditional, procreative 
views of marriage, which was a policy decision for legislatures to make instead 
of courts). The emerging academic commentary on the case is mixed, but Jus-
tices Alito and Scalia are not alone in their concern that the gay rights cases 
defy conventional doctrinal logic and proper judicial respect for state laws. See, 
e.g., Carpenter, supra note 107 (defending Windsor on anti-animus principles); 
Gerken, supra note 123 (describing an inner logic of the opinion as arising 
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Many argued that the test used in these cases could not ac-
curately be described as “rational basis” as conventionally un-
derstood,233 and described the analysis as a hybrid form of “ra-
tional basis with bite” or even “intermediate scrutiny” as courts 
tried to synthesize these results and locate them along the due 
process/equal protection spectrum.234 Many also said—
accurately, in our view—that a cascade upward had occurred, 
such that all sexual orientation classifications had become pre-
 
from the interplay of constitutional rights and structure in a way that clears 
space for change); Richard S. Myers, The Implications of Justice Kennedy’s 
Opinion in United States v. Windsor, 6 ELON L. REV. 323, 323 (2014) (critiqu-
ing the opinion on judicial craftsmanship grounds); Sandy Levinson, A Brief 
Comment on Justice Kennedy’s Opinion in Windsor, BALKINIZATION (June 26, 
2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/a-brief-comment-on-justice-kennedys 
.html (describing the opinion as “blather”). 
 233. See Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 816–18 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that Lawrence requires elevated scrutiny under due process). But 
consider other cases that rely on marriage as a fundamental right, which 
therefore requires strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 
1209, 1217 (10th Cir. 2014) (relying on marriage as a fundamental right, re-
quiring strict scrutiny); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 473 (E.D. Va. 
2014) (relying on marriage as a fundamental right); cf. Bishop v. United States 
ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1295 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (invalidating pro-
hibitions on same-sex marriage on grounds it failed to satisfy the rational ba-
sis test under equal protection). 
 234. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014) (striking down 
same-sex marriage ban in Idaho on heightened scrutiny under equal protec-
tion); Witt, 527 F.3d at 813 (holding that Lawrence requires elevated scrutiny 
under due process); see also Ian Bartrum, The Ninth Circuit’s Treatment of 
Sexual Orientation: Defining “Rational Basis Review with Bite,” 112 MICH. L. 
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 142 (2014) (examining the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to 
establish a standard); cf. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing that Lawrence does not mandate elevated scrutiny); Lofton v. Sec’y of the 
Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating 
elevated scrutiny is not mandated by Lawrence). Russell Robinson recently 
expressed concern that the Court’s departure from conventional tiers of scru-
tiny in the LGBT cases has not been followed in other domains. See Robinson, 
supra note 123 (stating that the Court has “turned its back on groups who 
once benefited from ‘animus’ review, including people with disabilities and 
poor people”). One reason—though likely not the complete explanation—may 
be that the LGBT cases entailed the removal of sexual orientation distinctions 
only after the challengers demonstrated that no possible rational justification 
for the distinction existed. The irrationality may have been inspired by ani-
mus, but not necessarily. It was the challenged laws, rather than the group of 
litigants, that were exceptional in these cases. The litigants also sought only 
“sameness equality.” This simple version of equality has always been easiest 
for the Court to embrace and implement. With disability and wealth distinc-
tions, in contrast, removal of distinctions will usually cause dramatic costs or 
consequences that may demonstrate a rational basis for the law in the first 
place. Nevertheless, where the laws make distinctions on the basis of poverty 
or disability for no rational reason, they should tumble. The LGBT cases may 
help in bringing their demise. 
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sumptively irrational rather than presumptively rational.  
But this does not mean that the rational basis test is im-
modest or was distorted in the process of reaching these out-
comes. An alternative understanding of this legal history is 
that the judicial conclusions that look aggressive today (i.e., 
that the regulation of sexual orientation for its own sake now 
comes with a strong presumption of irrationality) occurred only 
over the course of many decades of legal challenges, during 
which courts grew comfortable with a change in default. More 
to our point here, the judicial work of striking down sexual ori-
entation-specific laws was principally done without relying ex-
clusively on the usual “strict scrutiny” formalities. The judici-
ary worked slowly235 up from the rational basis floor to a higher 
scrutiny perch.236 Loss after loss preceded small victories that 
only slowly eroded the edifice of resistance and finally resulted 
in doctrinal openings. The pace of this was glacial, not gallop-
ing. And the basic legal question was throughout the one ra-
tional basis scrutiny was meant to advance: is the law here 
based on rational premises and permissible public ends? If not, 
what residual explanation for the law remains, and can this be 
squared with constitutional liberty or equality precepts?  
When, for example, the government argued that allowing 
same-sex marriage would discourage opposite-sex marriage, 
the courts demanded evidence to justify that conclusion. In 
Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court responded by saying “it is unre-
alistic to conclude that an opposite-sex couple would choose not 
to marry simply because same-sex couples may do so.”237 The 
Court also identified four principles and traditions that support 
 
 235. Much has been said about the rapid pace of change in this corner of 
constitutional law. It only feels rapid to those who have just tuned in to sexual 
orientation law post-1990, or even post-2000, not to those who have toiled a 
lifetime in these liberty-free vineyards. The law actually moved glacially, even 
though the cumulative effect of the piecemeal progress is now having cascade-
type effects. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13 (providing a legal history of the 
movement); Case, supra note 99; Rivera, supra note 99; Rubenstein, supra 
note 99. 
 236. The evolutionary process in sexual orientation cases is very similar to 
the evolution in gender cases from rational basis to elevated, “intermediate” 
level scrutiny. For a recent discussion of this history, see Katie R. Eyer, Con-
stitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 527 (2014). Roots of rational basis review used in Windsor also may lie 
in cases like Bell’s Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, which point to the “unu-
sual” nature of a prohibition as a hat tip that something irrational may be 
afoot. Bell’s Gap R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890) (dictum); 
see also Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37–38 (1928) (ex-
amining principles included in the Due Process Clause). 
 237. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
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marriage as a fundamental right under the Constitution and 
concluded they “apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”238 
These passages reflected the prior work of exploring in detail 
whether the government’s justifications for prohibiting same-
sex marriage rested on constitutionally sound reasons. By con-
stitutionally sound, of course, this meant secular reasons that 
could survive judicial inspection.  
To be sure, the Court’s ultimate conclusion in Obergefell 
did not rest on reasonableness alone. The majority also relied 
on marriage as a fundamental interest,239 the “immutable na-
ture” of homosexuality,240 and on how exclusion from marriage 
demeaned and stigmatized those whose liberty was denied,241 
including their children.242 This combination of constitutionally 
relevant issues carried the day. But it now will be difficult in-
deed—even in a non-fundamental rights case—for government 
to justify using sexual orientation as a basis for denying liberty 
interests. Government use of sexual orientation distinctions in 
most, if not all contexts, likely will be deemed irrational. 
The doctrinal journey to the Court’s holding that prohibi-
tions on same-sex marriage violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
thus is usefully instructive. It illustrates vividly that the ra-
tional basis floor can be the start of a continuum, not a wholly 
discrete point in the liberty landscape.243 The cases also illus-
trate that early litigation losses can serve a worthy liberty pur-
pose, and may eventually culminate in new due process rights 
or the expansion of old ones. When the rational basis test offers 
a remote chance of success, courts have the opportunity to 
learn from losing litigants who continue to beg for the sanctu-
ary and mercy of the Due Process Clause. These are the prob-
lems and grievances that will not go away, and will be instruc-
tive in the slow evolution of justice. 
The sexual orientation cases also moved some constitu-
 
 238. Id. at 2599. As to one of these principles—that marriage “is a keystone 
of the Nation’s social order”—the Court stated “[t]here is no difference be-
tween same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle.” Id. at 
2590. 
 239. Id. at 2598. 
 240. Id. at 2594. 
 241. Id. at 2602. 
 242. Id. at 2590. 
 243. As Justice Harlan noted in Poe v. Ullman, “This ‘liberty’ [guaranteed 
by the Due Process Clause] is not a series of isolated points pricked out in 
terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion . . . . 
It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from 
all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.” 367 U.S. 
497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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tional law talk away from the arid formalities of “tiers of re-
view” and strict enumeration, in favor of a more openly factored 
balance of liberty-related concerns. Rational basis—even with 
“bite”—was more accurately and sympathetically seen as one 
bloom in the common constitutional garden, not as a hothouse 
orchid. Equal protection rationality was seen—accurately—as 
one petal on the substantive due process bloom, not as a wholly 
separate shoot.  
One thing is clear: Lochner no longer controls all of the 
doctrine, and it should be read in its proper historical context.244 
As Chief Justice Hughes observed, “[l]iberty in each of its phas-
es has its history and its connotations.”245 The proper use of our 
Lochner experience now is to ask the following question: when 
does modest judicial oversight of government regulation best 
serve the overall constitutional value in preventing arbitrary 
incursions into liberty, without undermining unduly other wor-
thy government ends? The wrong use of Lochner history is to 
claim this 1905 case and its aftermath answers the question 
with an absolute, uncompromising “Never!”246  
As we explain below, the substantive due process floor 
tests offer useful and cabined responses to abuses of govern-
ment power. Moreover, precisely because of their humble sta-
tus, they offer a conservative alternative to the current practice 
of force-fitting remedies into the doctrines of enumerated con-
stitutional rights. 
 
 244. Historians know that the best use of history is not as a book of an-
swers to modern dilemmas, but as guidelines to what questions to ask. See 
MARGARET MACMILLAN, DANGEROUS GAMES: THE USES AND ABUSES OF HIS-
TORY 44 (2008); see also Toni M. Massaro, Substantive Due Process, Black 
Swans, and Innovation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 987, 1013–15 (2011).  
 245. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). 
 246. Justice Scalia has made a similar overcorrection with his analogy be-
tween reproductive rights and Chief Justice Taney’s logic in the Dred Scott 
opinion. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001–02 
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In fairness to Justice 
Scalia, Dred Scott did invoke substantive due process to strike down congres-
sional power to “deprive[] a citizen of the United States of his liberty or prop-
erty, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular 
territory of the United States . . . [such an Act of Congress] could hardly be 
dignified with the name of due process of law.” Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 
(19 How.) 393, 450 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. But the extrapolation from that constitutional law low 
point to tarnish all other applications of substantive due process is far from 
convincing. See also Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Story of Dred Scott: 
Originalism’s Forgotten Past, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 155, 155 (Mi-
chael C. Dorf ed., 2009) (critiquing originalist defenses of Dred Scott). 
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B. CRITICISM OF THE OUTRAGEOUSNESS TEST 
The outrageousness test has been criticized on two 
grounds. First, it addresses problems that are better left to 
state tort remedies. Second, it uses a standard that is too vague 
and subjective to be a legitimate source of rights. 
To promote analytical clarity, some scholars have argued 
that the outrageousness test applies only when the state actor 
has violated a fundamental or specifically enumerated constitu-
tional right, and courts should otherwise abstain and allow 
state tort law to define the scope of remedies.247 Richard Fallon 
points to Parratt v. Taylor248 for support of the doctrinal clean-
up—though he has made clear that he does not think Parratt 
was decided correctly as a normative matter.249 In Parratt, the 
Court found no due process violation when a prison inmate’s 
hobbyist materials were taken from the prison mailroom.250 Be-
cause the prisoner could bring a negligence claim or some other 
tort action, the Court determined that the prisoner received all 
the process that was due to him.251 Fallon infers from the 
Court’s lack of substantive analysis that it was backing away 
from the outrageousness test any time the government actor’s 
misconduct could be covered by traditional tort law.252 This ab-
stention norm could apply in every case brought under the out-
rageousness test since the tort of Intentional Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress is designed to root out similarly undefined out-
outrageous conduct; so if Fallon is correct, the constitutional 
outrageousness test would be wiped out.253 
 
 247. Fallon, supra note 86, at 346–47; Henry Paul Monaghan, State Law 
Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 979, 991 (1986). The Court has said that substantive due process is not a 
“font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be 
administered by the states.” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).  
 248. 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
 249. Fallon, supra note 86, at 344–45. 
 250. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 527, 543. 
 251. Fallon, supra note 86, at 340–41. 
 252. Id. 
 253. The rule would make the outrageousness test largely moot since the 
tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) is a close analog to 
the constitutional protections offered by the shocks-the-conscience test. IIED 
provides relief for malicious and outrageous conduct of any variety, and abuses 
of authority are a common form of sanctionable behavior. See Brandon v. 
County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2001) (abusive questioning of 
rape victim); Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308 (D.C. 1994) (valid IIED claim 
where police made harassing jokes to a rape victim). But see Costello v. Mitch-
ell Pub. Sch. Dist. 79, 266 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2001) (teacher at a public middle 
school was not sufficiently “outrageous” by calling a student “stupid” and “re-
tarded” in front of her classmates). See generally DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE 
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While we agree that garden-variety minor abuses of power 
are better redressed, if at all, through state tort law, we do not 
think that Parratt did or should mark a shift in the substantive 
due process outrageousness test. A case based on the mis-
placement of $27 worth of hobbyist materials is unrecognizable 
as the sort of malicious deprivation and degradation that the 
outrageousness test had previously addressed, and Justice 
Powell distinguished Parratt from Rochin and other outra-
geousness cases on that basis.254 Moreover, when government 
actors abuse their authority in conscience-shocking ways, their 
cruelty puts the victim at the mercy of not merely another indi-
vidual, but of the government itself. While the same facts are 
likely to make a good tort claim if they have any chance of suc-
cess under the due process outrageousness test, the overlap in 
remedies is no more consequential than the overlap in equal 
protection and employment discrimination law, or in free 
speech and Anti-SLAPP law. 
But this leaves the vagueness criticism. There is no deny-
ing that the outrageousness test flirts with subjectivity. As one 
court put it, “the measure of what is conscience shocking is no 
calibrated yard stick.”255 Case-specific facts matter greatly, and 
thus no decision under the test provides more than loose guid-
ance for the next set of facts.  
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the outrageousness test 
evoked a mocking concurring opinion by Justice Scalia, in 
which he described the test as the “ne plus ultra, the Napoleon 
Brandy, the Mahatma Gandhi, the Cellophane of subjectivi-
ty.”256 His Cole Porter-inspired contempt for the open-ended due 
process test has been echoed by other federal judges.257 (Scalia 
 
LAW OF TORTS §§ 385–89 (2d. ed. 2011). 
 254. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 553. 
 255. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998). 
 256. Id. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 257. See, e.g., Mays v. City of East St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“‘[S]ubstantive due process’ is an oxymoron.”); United States v. Miller, 
891 F.2d 1265, 1271, 1273 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (de-
scribing the Rochin shocks-the-conscience test as “not a rule of any kind, let 
alone a command of the Due Process Clause”); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 118–19 (2013) (noting that standards for determin-
ing whether government may be held liable for due process violations are 
“[v]erbosity masquerading as precision” and add confusion when they demand 
that the defendant “not only have acted recklessly, but have shocked the con-
science—whatever that means . . . . I don’t know what the expression means, 
or what it adds to indifference to a known risk of injury”); cf. Slade v. Bd. of 
Sch. Dirs. of Milwaukee, 702 F.3d 1027, 1033 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that 
“shocks the conscience” is “not a very illuminating expression, and we don’t 
know what it adds to recklessness. Reckless indifference to a child’s safety 
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is also dubious of substantive due process challenges that use 
the irrationality test for the same reason—that it permits free-
wheeling by the judiciary258—but he has been less consistent in 
his criticisms and voting behavior in those cases, as we discuss 
below.) 
The subjectivity critique of outrageousness fails to account 
for three important features. First, the very flexibility that 
makes the test seem subjective is also its virtue. The test is in-
terstitial. By design, it catches government offenses that would 
otherwise slip through the doctrinal cracks. Second, although 
the “shocks-the-conscious” rule seems subjective, in practice the 
standard has been extremely demanding on litigants who seek 
its help. To the extent there is error in the system, it goes only 
one way—in the government’s favor. Thus, while the test is 
flexible, it is inaccurate to call it subjective. Subjectivity sug-
gests that it operates at the whim of the particular preferences 
and attitudes of the judge. In fact, the outrageousness test in-
tervenes only in instances where reasonable minds would agree 
that the government has engaged in misconduct (and it doesn’t 
even intervene in all of them). Third, precisely because it offers 
the last hope for recourse when something has gone wrong, 
judges who take seriously their responsibility to curb abuses of 
government power will undoubtedly find an abstract constitu-
tional value to do it. If the outrageousness test isn’t available, 
they will reach the same result some other way.  
First, the designed flexibility. The very idea of an outra-
geousness floor is that neither the framers nor the judges in-
terpreting the Constitution can anticipate in advance all the 
myriad ways that government actors will harass or torment 
their subjects. Thus, if left only to existing definitions of consti-
tutional rights, courts would be forced to leave some abuses of 
power unacknowledged and undeterred. Cases like Rochin 
show that the Supreme Court, at least at one time, could not 
live with the consequences of that setup without feeling that 
they abdicated their responsibilities to check abusive govern-
ment.  
An analogous problem confronts state courts when they are 
tasked with the responsibility to protect the state’s residents 
 
would doubtless shock the conscience, but . . . negligence doesn’t”).  
 258. He has objected when the Due Process Clause has been invoked to 
strike down gay marriage bans (United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)), to create privacy rights (NASA v. Nelson, 
562 U.S. 134, 160–61 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)), and to protect corpora-
tions from excessive punitive damage awards (BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).  
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from each other through tort law. When we pester and torment 
each other, our conduct may fall within one of the longstanding 
torts like battery, assault, or trespass. But often, too often to be 
ignored, whether by chance or human ingenuity, a tormentor 
will manage to intentionally inflict seriously harm on another 
person without using conduct that falls into the traditional cat-
egories of relief.259 When they do, their victims can pray for re-
lief under the tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Dis-
tress (IIED). Much like the substantive due process floor test, 
IIED requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s con-
duct was outrageous in order to ensure that the behavior is vile 
enough so as not to require the notice and judicial guidance 
that other tort doctrines offer.260 
Likewise, the substantive due process “outrageousness” 
floor provides a gap-filler that provides justice and relief in un-
precedented and unanticipated circumstances. This gap-filler is 
both necessary and desirable. 
One may worry that the benefits of creating a constitution-
al stop-gap will be outweighed by the havoc that can result 
from an ambiguous and subjective test (a test that is, ironically, 
arbitrary). But the last sixty years of outrageousness precedent 
contradicts this theory. Perhaps because the test developed 
with the most self-conscious attention to the potential for actu-
al and perceived abuses of judicial discretion, claims of outra-
geousness encounter stiff headwinds. 
In short, conscience-shocking behavior happens, but courts 
only rarely call it unconstitutional. It would be foolish to claim 
that the rulings do not suffer from some amount of subjectivity, 
but the subjectivity appears to cause vastly more of one type of 
error (non-relief for deserving claims) than the other. 
Nevertheless, even in cases where courts defer to executive 
officials, they do address the conscience-shocking due process 
argument on the merits; they do not dismiss it on Rule 11 
grounds or as otherwise wholly beyond the judicial pale.261 The-
se rulings also are sometimes written over passionate, eloquent 
dissents. Finally, a world in which the due process arguments 
are aired, and the most egregious wrongs occasionally are ad-
 
 259. Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 845 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1988); 
Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 69 (Md. 1991). 
 260. Brandon v. County of Richardson, 264 N.W.2d 604, 620–21 (Neb. 
2001). 
 261. Cf. Timothy Sandefur, Rational Basis and the 12(b)(6) Motion: An 
Unnecessary “Perplexity,” 25 GEO. MASON CIV. RTS. L.J. 43 (2014) (discussing 
use of 12(b)(6) motions in rational basis cases). 
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dressed, is better than one in which all such claims are categor-
ically denied. 
This leads to the third argument rebutting charges of sub-
jectivity: because courts are the final enforcer of the Constitu-
tion’s abstract commitments to a restrained government, judges 
will have an irresistible urge to shut down abuses that they 
find undeniably shocking.  
For example, when a suspended police officer was required 
to undergo a penile plethysmograph as a condition of rein-
statement, this shocked the judicial conscience.262 In another 
case, the forced paralysis, intubation, and a digital rectal exam-
ination of a suspect in custody also violated the outrageousness 
test even though the police reasonably believed the suspect had 
contraband in his rectum.263 The court added that, by definition, 
this also violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.264 But it treated the two 
constitutional inquiries as reinforcing, rather than mutually 
exclusive.  
Both cases involved bodily restraints, which have been de-
scribed as a core liberty concern.265 Both involved especially in-
vasive police procedures. Other forms of misconduct, though, 
have also passed the test. Intentional framing of innocent per-
 
 262. Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 43–44 (1st Cir. 1992). A penile 
plethysmograph is a machine for measuring the circumference of the penis, 
sometimes used to determine male sexual arousal or blood flow to the penis. 
Cf. United States v. McLaurin, 731 F.3d 258 (2d Cir. 2013) (striking down use 
of penile plethysmography testing as a condition of supervised release, on 
grounds that it was extraordinarily invasive and violated substantive due pro-
cess); United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 571 (9th Cir. 2006) (Noonan, J., 
concurring) (“There is a line at which the government must stop. Penile 
plethysmography testing crosses it.”). 
 263. United States v. Booker, 728 F.3d 535 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 264. Id. at 546 (“[I]nvestigative conduct that would shock the conscience for 
purposes of the Due Process Clause is ‘unreasonable’ for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
 265. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); see also Martinez v. 
City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing a due process 
claim where it was alleged that an officer interfered with medical treatment of 
the plaintiff while screaming in pain); Bounds v. Hanneman, No. 13-266 
(JRT/FLN), 2014 WL 1303711 (D. Minn. Feb. 4, 2014) (holding that plaintiff 
properly stated a claim of substantive due process where DRE officer trainees 
recruited citizens to smoke large amounts of marijuana for purposes of obser-
vational training of officers, where there were allegations that police threat-
ened citizens with arrest if they did not participate, on grounds that this was 
invasion of bodily integrity that shocked the conscience); Callaway v. N.J. 
State Police Troop A, No. 12-5477 (RBK), 2013 WL 1431668, at *16 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 9, 2013) (noting that “conscience shocking” typically provides relief in 
cases of physical abuse).  
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sons for crimes has been held to shock the conscience.266 Where 
a prosecutor allegedly failed to disclose a forensic report in or-
der to secure a grand jury indictment against a defendant, and 
withheld the information to cover up for others, this supported 
a substantive due process shock-the-conscience claim.267  
If forced, courts and advocates could be creative in their la-
beling and framing of claims so that these uncategorizable of-
fenses could be fit into existing categories. But it is not credible 
to think that the judiciary would let all or even most of these 
types of claims die, and finding alternate sources of relief would 
require intellectual dishonesty and doctrinal incoherence. We 
will return to this idea in Subpart D. 
C. CRITICISM OF THE IRRATIONALITY TEST 
Because the rational basis test is typically invoked to chal-
lenge legislation, it tends to get a different sort of critique—one 
based in realism. The “laws as sausages” joke has a good deal of 
truth to it. What it takes to get laws passed often may have 
more to do with political logrolling and other compromises than 
any overarching logic.268 And the lines drawn by the laws often 
are easily critiqued for their under- and overinclusion. Expect-
ing more from legislators would be an act of naiveté. 
Political processes do, of course, involve compromises and 
deals brokered between legislators with disharmonious mind-
sets. And often, a legislator’s political philosophy is indistin-
 
 266. See, e.g., Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 44–45 (1st Cir. 2004). Note, 
however, that perjury, where it occurred in a peripheral hearing and was not 
shown to have prejudiced the defendant’s right to a fair trial, was not found to 
be outrageous. See, e.g., People v. Uribe, 199 Cal. App. 4th 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2011). 
 267. See Pyles v. Village of Manteno, No. 13-CV-2114, 2013 WL 6459484 
(C.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2013). 
 268. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
2387, 2395 (2003) (discussing how statutes often take odd shapes in response 
to behind-the-scenes maneuvers). A related concern might be the lack of judi-
cial capacity for the Supreme Court to be called on to double-check the work of 
the lower courts using their authority in this way. See Andrew B. Coan, Judi-
cial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J. 422, 437 
(2012) (discussing why high volume legal domains often result in courts either 
applying “clear-cut categorical rules, which reduce uncertainty for potential 
litigants and thus reduce the volume of litigation, or . . . abandon[ing] any-
thing resembling the full potential enforcement of [the constitutional provi-
sion]” and concluding that “possibly it will feel compelled to do both”). We 
think that both substantive due process floor tests have ample room embedded 
in the doctrines to avoid judicial capacity problems because the tests are 
slanted toward government success and are so context-dependent that their 
use does not typically demand Supreme Court review. 
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guishable from a set of positions he would take when guided 
solely by political and financial self-interest. But this does not 
unravel the need for a rational basis test.  
The rational basis test accommodates the garden-variety 
political negotiations and their inherent political nonsense. 
Properly used, rational basis review is not a vehicle for voicing 
mere grumblings about the chaos, the slights, the inanities, 
and the unevenness of lawmaking, with its pocket vetoes and 
pork politics. It focuses instead on the fallout of the messy polit-
ical process and allows individuals who bear the brunt of that 
fallout to seek judicial relief if political negotiations have been 
exploited to serve ends that add no value to society. Rational 
basis is a way (often the only way) to illuminate the worst and 
the most novel forms of government chicanery. These are cases 
in which animus, political capture, and gross violations of pub-
lic trust depart from the barest expectations that the govern-
ment will engage in public-minded pursuits. They challenge 
regulations that go too far, with too little justification, and 
cause especially grave consequences that are distributed with 
callous indifference toward the burdened.  
This is why due process irrationality so often travels with 
equal protection irrationality: government officials are far less 
likely to impose egregious consequences on themselves or their 
most influential constituents. One need not consult Rawls’s 
“veil of ignorance”269 to see how this works: laws that bind the 
lawmakers themselves are less likely to suffer from the local-
ized deafness-to-justice defect that often infects laws that apply 
to others. Thus, most of the worst cases of lawmaking typically 
apply to subsets of the population, and present issues of both 
liberty and equality. While close judicial scrutiny of all legisla-
tive action is neither practical nor desirable for a representa-
tive democracy, judicial oversight at the outer limits of legisla-
tive mischief can be quite consistent with the American form of 
constrained democratic government. 
D. THE NEGLECTED VIRTUES OF THE FLOOR TESTS 
The force of these well-rehearsed arguments against the 
floor tests is plain. Utterly missing from the scornful critiques, 
however, is how the floor tests can make valuable and con-
 
 269. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118–23 (rev. ed. 1999) (developing 
a theory of fairness in which a parties should consider justice principles from 
behind a veil of ignorance that masks the position they themselves would oc-
cupy within the system, to prevent them from developing rules biased in their 
favor). 
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servative contributions to the larger project of defining consti-
tutional rights and protecting baseline liberties. 
First, the floor tests allow for public airing of government 
misconduct, even when courts uphold that behavior. The 
chance to make one’s case in a court of law in and of itself ex-
presses important due process and other values.270 Like voting, 
litigating may often be an exercise in futility and even “irra-
tional.”271 But it still has expressive, political, and social mean-
ing that matters to the litigants and to fellow citizens. This air-
ing, of course, may itself have worthwhile deterrent effects, 
particularly if the lawsuit attracts media attention. The eco-
nomic and political costs of defending claims of arguably outra-
geous and irrational uses of power may play a role in curtailing 
misconduct even without a successful legal resolution. Thus, 
even a weak and embattled substantive due process floor test 
can make valuable contributions. 
Second, the floor tests can help constrain judicial power, 
counterintuitive as this sounds. There are only two, extreme, 
alternatives to the flexible floor tests: no review or elevated 
scrutiny review through a different constitutional channel. Be-
cause judges, purely as a descriptive matter, will not be able to 
stomach the former in extreme cases, substantive due process 
floors provide a cautious, conservative alternative to the latter.  
For example, in Wood v. Ryan, an Arizona death row in-
mate requested a preliminary injunction to stay his execution 
until the state provided him with information about the chemi-
cal cocktail that the department of corrections would use in 
their lethal injection.272 He brought his claim as a First 
Amendment challenge, claiming that the state’s nondisclosure 
violated his right to access information.273 A Ninth Circuit panel 
agreed and was prepared to expand a narrow First Amendment 
right for the public to access the courts to cover Wood’s claim, 
despite the fact that it was a misfit for the public access doc-
trine.274 Two Ninth Circuit judges wrote dissents to the Circuit’s 
 
 270. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 110 (2006). 
 271. See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, TOWARDS A MATHEMATICS OF POLITICS 
37–49 (1967) (arguing that voting appears irrational given costs versus vote 
value); cf. Richard L. Hasen, Voting Without Law?, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2135 
(1996) (arguing that social norms solve the paradox of voting). 
 272. Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 21 
(2014). 
 273. Id. at 1079. 
 274. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1088. Contra Owens v. Hill, 758 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 
2014) (holding it is not unconstitutional to maintain the confidentiality of 
names and other identifying information of persons and entities involved in 
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decision to deny a rehearing en banc outlining the problems 
with the panel’s novel approach to the First Amendment,275 and 
the panel’s decision was promptly vacated by the Supreme 
Court.276 In light of the subsequent botched execution of Ryan,277 
which tends to confirm fears that lethal injection executions 
cannot be done humanely without more research and transpar-
ency, the issue, and the Ninth Circuit’s First Amendment theo-
ry, may come back around. 
Substantive due process would provide a better route to se-
cure death row inmates access to information related to their 
planned executions. If courts analyze this problem as a shock-
ing or irrational deprivation of information, they could avoid 
adding new, ambiguous First Amendment rights that might 
swell the amendment’s scope and further laden the inquiry into 
when executions are constitutional 
The third value that the floor tests contribute is that they 
work slowly, contextually, and tentatively. They provide a 
means of experimentation that relieves courts from the anxiety 
of forming permanent constitutional rules. In this zone, pre-
sumptions favor government and weigh against rights. Parties 
urging that government action is irrational must come with 
their litigation bags overflowing with arguments against actual 
and even hypothetical justifications for that action. They must 
break a huge sweat to overcome that strong presumption—and 
even then will encounter official immunities and other rules 
that give every advantage to the government.278 
The floor tests defy constitutional cubby-holing and resist 
over-theorizing. “Arbitrariness” and “irrationality” do a lot of 
work here, but with minimal consequences. The tests are in-
herently open-ended and vague, which allows the successful 
cases to dull in consequence over time if they turn out to be 
poorly reasoned.  
 
executions, including those who manufacture the drug or drugs to be used). 
 275. Wood, 759 F.3d at 1102, 1103–05 (Kozinski, C.J., and Callahan, J., 
dissenting). 
 276. Ryan v. Wood, 135 S. Ct. 21 (2014). 
 277. Ben Brumfield et al., No Evidence Arizona Execution Botched, Correc-
tions Chief Says, CNN (Sept. 8, 2014, 7:15 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/ 
24/justice/arizona-execution-controversy/.  
 278. One increasingly large barrier is elevated pleading standards. See 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544 (2007); see also Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A 
Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke L.J. 1 (2010); Ja-
cob A. Zuninga, Supervisory Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Wake of 
Iqbal and Connick: It May Be Misconceived but It’s Not a Misnomer, 56 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 601 (2014). 
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Conversely, when floor cases are decided well, and their 
reasoning does withstand the test of time, the cases can lead to 
thicker rights (as was the case with Rochin). This approach to 
constitutional experimentation recognizes that past is not al-
ways prologue, and that new problems may fit poorly into cus-
tomary ways of sorting and weighing liberty and equality.279  
Substantive floors offer judges some space to make doctri-
nal corrections, to experiment, and to allow half-baked ideas to 
rise (or not) in due time, all while checking the worst abuses 
that would otherwise evade constitutional redress.  
In short, if anything, judicial power skeptics should favor 
bolder use of the highly contextual rational basis/conscience-
shocking floors; both tend to block categorical movements of in-
dividual rights to fundamental right status and groups to sus-
pect classes—where elevated scrutiny applies, judicial power 
expands, and a strong presumption arises against government 
regulatory power. The rational basis floors preserve more space 
for experimentation and freedom for government actors than 
the alternative, clause-bound constitutional approaches. 
Healthy judicial power skepticism thus is compatible with ra-
tional basis floors, even if the floors are used very modestly, as 
intended. This latter approach is the course we endorse here. 
This approach—using the floor tests as testing grounds for 
rights that may develop more robustly over time—is precisely 
the reverse of the instruction given in Graham, discussed 
above. To have the sort of fluidity and tentativeness that we 
think these cases should have, courts will have to be encour-
aged to use due process instead of expanding existing doctrines 
related to enumerated or fundamental rights. 
We recognize, as we must, that there is no way to assure 
that a “just so” judicial balance will be struck in every case be-
tween the poles of deference and intervention. No judicial test 
can promise this. Also, this Article is not properly understood 
as a paean to judges and courts. We nevertheless conclude that 
modern judges can and should play a modest role in achieving 
due process equilibrium, and that the due process floors offer 
them vehicles for doing this thoughtfully and humbly.280 
 
 279. We favor a dynamic approach to due process. See SULLIVAN & 
MASSARO, supra note 97. We also concur with the legal realist view that the 
judicial construction of liberty is best seen as an evolving doctrine that is ever 
“headed for parts unknown.” Walton H. Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of 
Law, 48 ETHICS 269, 270 (1938). 
 280. See Scott H. Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (1980) (arguing that a search for rationality should 
pursue a realistic search for reasons that make a test a viable one); Fallon, su-
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Next we outline specific ways in which the floors have un-
tapped potential to bring coherence and intellectual honesty to 
the task of constitutional lawmaking. If regarded with less 
scorn and skepticism, substantive due process floors could help 
save the courts from introducing paradoxes and problems in 
other constitutional doctrines. 
VI.  POTENTIAL   
Once the confusion about the floor tests is removed, the 
sound reasons for their continued use become apparent. They 
allow the courts to secure a “background of liberty,” as Randy 
Barnett has called it, which has a modest and localized effect 
on the other branches.281  
As we have articulated above, the two floor tests, outra-
geousness and irrationality, are of a piece; they serve the com-
mon goal of preventing extreme abuses of power. But the sto-
ries of the two floor tests diverge when we consider the present 
and future.  
The irrationality test has its detractors, but between the 
cases protecting gay rights (favored by the left) and the cases 
protecting economic liberties (favored by the right), the rational 
basis test has become an accepted, if not welcome, guest to the 
constitutional party. Thus, irrationality is enjoying a period of 
relative respect and occasional employment.  
Outrageousness, on the other hand, still lurks Boo Radley-
like in the shadows, very rarely called into service. It has not 
 
pra note 86, at 316 n.38 (“For rationality review to be real rather than a sham, 
the court must be willing to make some independent assessment of legislative 
purpose.”). 
 281. See BARNETT, supra note 126. Although we like this phrase, our ar-
gument is based on a much more limited promise of protection than Barnett’s 
sweeping historical analysis of the natural rights backdrop of the Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. We simply note that the case law itself does not rule 
out substantive due process floors, and argue that late twentieth, and early 
twenty-first century unfolding developments suggest good reasons for the 
maintenance and occasional deployment of these floors. We echo David 
Strauss’s assumptions that judicial review of due process claims are im-
portant, and that judges are capable of furthering sensible substantive due 
process protections. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). And we join other commentators who have 
urged the modest use of rational basis scrutiny to assure that government ac-
tions that result in disparate treatment are not merely “an exercise of political 
power by those benefitted.” Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American 
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 69 (1985); cf. Sandefur, supra note 261, at 83 
(arguing that the rational basis test is best understood as an evidentiary pre-
sumption of constitutionality that can be overcome, rather than as a rigid for-
malistic test). 
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had a comparable moment of vindication. We think it could. 
The limited nature of the test, and its tolerance for experimen-
tation and slow growth, could come in very handy during times 
of great technological change. In particular, the test could be 
very useful for addressing the critical but baffling problems 
that involve privacy.282  
This Part explores how each of the floor tests (particularly 
outrageousness) can be put into more effective service without 
losing the modesty and restraint that help legitimate them in 
the first place. 
A. POTENTIAL FOR THE OUTRAGEOUSNESS TEST 
The outrageousness test could bring coherence to the 
Fourth Amendment if courts were unshackled from the Gra-
ham mandate to preferentially use enumerated rights over 
substantive due process. Judges confronted with the balance 
between individual privacy and government policy have few 
good options. If they grant Fourth Amendment or fundamental 
right status to a form of informational privacy, this requires 
more searching and pervasive judicial scrutiny of a breathtak-
ing range of government policies and conduct.283 Yet, if judges 
grant government carte blanche regulatory authority over new 
sources of detailed information, serious abuses of privacy and 
law enforcement discretion will be insulated from judicial re-
view. 
This bind is on magnificent display in the context of the 
Fourth Amendment’s third party doctrine. That rule permits 
the government to access records and transaction data held by 
third parties without constituting a Fourth Amendment 
search.284 The rationale for the third party doctrine was never 
terribly convincing,285 and the criticism has become all the more 
 
 282. An important point is that Justice Frankfurter saw the relationship 
between outrageous-type disgust and due process restraints on legislative 
conduct that unduly invades personal liberty. In his dissenting opinion in Poe 
v. Ullman, he cited Rochin in support of his conclusion that application to a 
married couple of a Connecticut statute that made use of contraceptives a 
crime violated substantive due process. 367 U.S. 497, 539, 548 (1961) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting). 
 283. See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 159 (2011) (holding that NASA 
background checks of contract employees did not violate any constitutional 
right of informational privacy that might exist, but declining to decide directly 
whether such a constitutional right does exist). 
 284. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979); United States v. Mil-
ler, 425 U.S. 435, 440–43 (1976). 
 285. See Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 113–15 
(2008) (arguing the logic behind the Stranger Principle is untenable); see also 
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fervent in the wake of the revelation that the NSA collected 
and stored telephonic metadata about every last American.286 
The collection itself is potentially troubling, and when com-
bined with some evidence that the government may target 
journalists and whistleblowers for criminal enforcement of mi-
nor crimes,287 the demand for doctrinal reform is understanda-
bly powerful. Thus, in United States v. Jones, a case consider-
ing the Fourth Amendment treatment of GPS devices, Justice 
Sotomayor took the opportunity to explicitly call out the third 
party doctrine as a rule in need of reconsideration.288 
The superficially satisfying solution is to recognize a 
Fourth Amendment interest in third party records that de-
scribe us, and to require a warrant (or at least reasonable sus-
picion) before law enforcement can collect them. This is precise-
ly the approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit.289 But it is 
destined for failure. 
As flawed as the third party doctrine is, creating Fourth 
Amendment rights in third party data will cause a range of 
problems and constitutional conflicts. When third party records 
document evidence of innocence (rather than guilt), a warrant 
requirement could have unintended consequences for wrongly 
accused criminal suspects.290 A warrant requirement could also 
come into conflict with the First Amendment speech rights of 
companies in instances where the consumer relationship has 
broken down and the company positively and voluntarily wish-
es to disclose its data to law enforcement.  
More fundamentally, the new rule could interfere with law 
enforcement to a degree that is simply untenable. Many crimes 
like fraud and insider trading are only detected through rec-
 
Sherry Colb, What Is a Search?: Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment 
Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 123 (2003) (con-
tending that the Court improperly “equat[es] risk-taking with inviting expo-
sure and equat[es] limited-audience with whole-world self-exposure”). 
 286. See infra notes 313–15 and accompanying text.  
 287. Emily Bazelon, Obama’s War on Journalists, SLATE (May 14, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/05/ 
obama_s_justice_department_holder_s_leak_investigations_are_outrageous_ 
and.html. 
 288. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring). 
 289. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1215–17 (11th Cir. 2014), 
vacated, 573 F. App’x 925 (mem.) (11th Cir. 2014) (holding there is a Fourth 
Amendment interest in protecting third party records and requiring law en-
forcement obtain search warrants prior to executing a search).  
 290. See generally Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 981 (2014) (discussing obstacles defendants face in obtaining 
third party data that could prove their innocence). 
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ords. A warrant requirement would give the government no av-
enue to build cases where reasonable suspicion does not al-
ready exist. Indeed, more than a century ago, the Supreme 
Court had to learn this lesson the hard way with first party 
records (the records maintained by the criminal suspects them-
selves). In Boyd v. United States, the Supreme Court recog-
nized a Fourth Amendment right to protect documents from 
compelled disclosure through subpoena processes.291 The protec-
tions devastated the government’s ability to investigate certain 
crimes—tax evasion and antitrust violations—and after several 
decades of problems, the Court gutted the rule in the 1976 case 
Fisher v. United States.292 
Although the information revolution will require the 
Fourth Amendment to adapt to new technological realities, a 
simple and comprehensive new rule is not likely to work.293 A 
rational basis or outrageousness approach to emerging privacy 
problems would allow courts to check the most egregious inva-
sions of individual privacy, with greater freedom to consider 
competing interests. This would permit courts to amble, not 
dash, up the rapidly evolving “constitutional privacy” path, and 
to consider the issues context by context. 
Two activities permitted under the current third party doc-
trine seem especially amenable to these tests. First, when the 
government specifically selects a target and collects long and 
detailed data histories without any individualized suspicion, 
and without limiting the collection to information potentially 
relevant to an already-committed crime, that collection reeks of 
discretion run amok. This type of information stalking may sat-
isfy the outrageousness floor test. Second, dragnet collection 
practices in which the government hoovers all the data for the 
vague and unlimited purpose of law enforcement or national 
security may also shock the conscience. Or, if the government 
cannot offer satisfactory evidence (under seal) that the collec-
 
 291. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886). 
 292. 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976); see also William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem 
and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1025 (1995) (citing 
Fisher as an example of the Court moving away from Fifth Amendment pro-
tections). 
 293. At some level the Supreme Court seems to know this, which is why 
the adaptations in Fourth Amendment law have been incremental and fact-
specific. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012), was decided on a 
narrow trespass theory of search, and Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 
2484–86 (2014), altered the search incident to arrest doctrine without making 
sweeping conclusions about the treatment of smart phones in criminal law en-
forcement. 
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tion program is effective, it may fail the rational basis test.294  
As the privacy rights evolution continues, courts should re-
tain this due process emergency cord. It can serve as a constitu-
tional gap filler for unanticipated horrors. The versatile due 
process floors also can be proving grounds for more protected 
constitutional privacy rights that can enable courts to amass 
evidence before mounting the graduated steps to higher levels 
of protection in specific privacy scenarios.  
As government-deployed devices for extracting infor-
mation, monitoring peoples’ lives, coercing individual conduct, 
and otherwise infringing on individual autonomy grow more 
sophisticated, more pervasive, more inventive, and harder to 
anticipate or detect, the “conscience shocking” floor may be-
come an ever more important constitutional tool for curbing of-
ficial enthusiasm.  
Its use may have made much more sense as the first or fi-
nal home for some Fourth Amendment cases that have caused 
confusion and incoherence. For example, in Safford Unified 
School District Number 1 v. Redding, the Supreme Court de-
cided that a strip search of a middle school student who may 
have been hiding four ibuprofen pills was an unreasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.295 This is clearly the 
right result. But the search was not precisely “unreasonable” in 
the sense that the term is used in other Fourth Amendment 
search cases involving schools and employers. Viewed strictly 
in terms of the evidence that the school principal had that the 
student was likely to be carrying over-the-counter drugs, that 
those drugs were a violation of school policy, and that the ad-
ministration had evidence that students not infrequently hid 
contraband in their underwear, the strip search arguably met 
 
 294. Christopher Slobogin has proposed treating these types of “panvasive” 
surveillance practices using political process theory, arguing that such surveil-
lance can only be reasonable if the public has demonstrated a sufficient 
amount of buy-in. Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Pro-
cess Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1724 (2014). 
Slobogin’s proposals run into ours in the sense that legislation authorizing 
“panvasive” surveillance would still have to survive rational basis scrutiny, 
which would “prevent[] completely foolish panvasive actions.” Id. at 1745 
n.119; see also Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General 
Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93, 159 (2007) (ex-
plaining that when a court uses rational basis review to invalidate a legisla-
tive decision, the court is determining whether a “rational legislature would 
have approved the policy”). 
 295. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 577 U.S. 364, 374–77 
(2009). 
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the standards previously required for school searches.296 That 
is, the school principal may have maintained the requisite 
amount of suspicion to be “justified at its inception”297 and 
enough reason to believe that searching the inside of her un-
derwear was within the scope of a search likely to uncover evi-
dence. 
But just like the stomach pumping in Rochin, this search 
was unreasonable despite its likelihood to uncover evidence be-
cause it was, in a word, outrageous. The offense was too small 
to justify so great an intrusion. The principal’s decision to 
search inside the student’s bra and underwear was shocking in 
light of its lack of proportionality to the student’s offense. The 
risk of deciding Redding under the Fourth Amendment rather 
than the substantive due process clause is that the reasoning—
this mismatch between the offense and the style of search—is 
not consistent with other Fourth Amendment cases that have 
insisted that the severity of an offense does not alter the analy-
sis.298 The outrageousness test would have spared courts this 
Fourth Amendment mess.299 
Or consider the doctrinal epicycles that the Court has 
crafted in the law of self-incrimination. As every culturally con-
scious American knows, the police must provide Miranda warn-
ings to the subject of an interrogation in order for his confes-
sion to be admissible.300 However, in order to accommodate deep 
skepticism for the Miranda rule within and outside the judici-
ary, the Supreme Court has weakened the effect of the Miran-
da rule by limiting the remedy available when Miranda warn-
 
 296. See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 325–26 (1985) (holding that 
the search of a public school student by a school administrator was reasonable 
for Fourth Amendment purposes because the administrator possessed reason-
able suspicion that the student had cigarettes in her purse). 
 297. Id. at 326. 
 298. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) (declining to 
adopt a new Fourth Amendment test which would measure the constitutional-
ity of a traffic test by “whether a police officer, acting reasonably, would have 
made the stop for the reason given”); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945, 953 (2012) (“There is no precedent for the proposition that whether a 
search has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being investigated.”). 
 299. For similar reasons, substantive due process is a better source of 
rights for public school students who are subject to excessive or inhumane dis-
cipline. See Lewis M. Wasserman, Students’ Freedom from Excessive Force by 
Public School Officials: A Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment Right?, 21 KAN. J. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 35 (2011) (documenting the confusion among courts about 
which constitutional amendment to use, and endorsing the use of the Fourth 
Amendment in light of Graham’s rule, which requires litigants to use only 
enumerated rights if one is applicable).  
 300. Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 466, 467 (1966). 
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ings are not provided. An unwarned but voluntary confession 
can be used to impeach a criminal defendant who takes the 
stand and states something that contradicts the earlier confes-
sion,301 and witnesses or physical evidence discovered because 
of unwarned statements could also be introduced.302 The great-
est retraction of Miranda’s force came from Oregon v. Elstad.303 
There the Court decided that because the Miranda warning is a 
constitutionally mandated prophylaxis but not a constitutional 
violation itself, prosecutors can introduce evidence of a defend-
ant’s confession even if the defendant had first confessed with-
out Miranda warnings, and was subsequently Mirandized and 
led back through the narrative he had just provided.304 The 
product of this back-and-forth between pro- and anti-Miranda 
positions was a clear (if not entirely principled) scheme that 
permitted the police to take full advantage of unwarned confes-
sions short of introducing the un-Mirandized confession itself. 
This scheme was well established when an enterprising po-
lice force in Rolla, Missouri decided to exploit the holding in 
Elstad. The police developed a protocol for custodial interroga-
tion such that officers would routinely extract a confession 
without Miranda warnings and would then Mirandize the sus-
pect, seek a waiver, and retrace the same ground to produce an 
admissible confession.305 Rolla’s was not the only police depart-
ment to implement this interrogation technique, proving that, 
contrary to expectations, policemen are perfectly capable “legal 
technicians.”306 The Court could not stand by and watch the po-
lice department “disfigure” the Elstad holding and intentionally 
undermine the effects of the Miranda warnings.307  
However, the facts of Missouri v. Seibert presented a chal-
lenge to the justices. On many previous occasions the Court had 
insisted that the subjective mental state of a police officer is not 
relevant to Fourth and Fifth Amendment criminal procedural 
rules.308 Yet here they were clearly disturbed most by the police 
 
 301. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971). 
 302. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450–52 (1974). 
 303. 470 U.S. 298, 308–09 (1985). 
 304. Id. 
 305. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004). 
 306. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). 
 307. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 614. 
 308. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2011) (explaining that a 
bad faith analysis is “fundamentally inconsistent with our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence”). 
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department’s intentional exploitation of the rules.309 Committed 
to working within the Miranda doctrine, the Court decided that 
the effects of Seibert’s unwarned interrogation had not worn off 
by the time the police Mirandized her and asked for a waiver.310 
This sub-rule—this exception to the exception to the suppres-
sion remedy—introduces a murky analysis to Miranda cases 
that has little to do with the problem that actually miffed the 
judges: government conniving. If the Court had chosen instead 
to work within the outrageousness doctrine of substantive due 
process, it could have crafted its holding and reasoning to the 
intentional exploitation of the rules that actually shocked the 
justices.311 
More generally, manipulation, venality, and viciousness 
are not new human vices; but there now are manifold new ways 
in which they may express themselves that may make official 
stomach pumping look quaint. Even well-intentioned govern-
ment actors, though, may be tempted to abuse their authority 
when offered tools with unprecedented power to detect and pos-
sibly prevent crime, terrorism, health and safety threats, fraud, 
economic disasters, and other social harms more effectively.312 
As ever, the constitutional question will be whether the liberty 
costs are outweighed by the social benefits. The Rochin base-
line should be a starting point for that slow and deliberate ex-
ploration. 
 
 309. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617 (describing the police as “[s]trategists dedicat-
ed to draining the substance out of Miranda”). 
 310. Id. at 616–17. 
 311. Another example comes from Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 611–12 
(1999), in which the Supreme Court decided that law enforcement officers who 
bring members of the press with them during the execution of a warrant com-
mit a Fourth Amendment violation. Because police are permitted to bring 
some civilians with them during a warranted search, the Court had to create a 
sub-rule within the Fourth Amendment that evaluated the “legitimacy” of the 
third party observer even though the law enforcement officers complied with 
the limits of the warrant. Id. Since the impropriety had less to do with the va-
lidity of the warrant and its execution and more to do with the filming and 
disclosure of sensitive information from inside the home to the general public, 
the Court could have (and should have) categorized this abuse of authority as 
a due process violation. 
 312. The Court in Riley v. California recognized the power of new technolo-
gy to invade privacy, when it unanimously held that police generally may not, 
without a warrant, search digital information seized from an individual who 
has been arrested. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). The government argued strenuous-
ly, but unsuccessfully, that the cell phone data was vulnerable to remote wip-
ing that could seriously compromise law enforcement ends. Id.  
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B. POTENTIAL FOR THE IRRATIONALITY TEST 
The rational basis test, too, has untapped potential for 
courts to tentatively explore constitutional protections against 
an overbearing government.  
Again, the due process floor tests can come to the aid of a 
sprawling mess of Fourth Amendment rules by offering relief 
from general police policies that cause foreseeable and unjusti-
fied harm to the jurisdiction’s residents. Two examples can il-
lustrate the prospects. 
First, the section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act that authorized the bulk collection of cell phone metadata 
without any accompanying restrictions on use313 was arguably 
irrational, especially if the data is as useless as Senator Leahy 
has claimed it is at detecting and thwarting terrorist plots.314 
Using the rational basis test could save Courts from creating 
precedents in reaction to the NSA surveillance programs that 
badly conflict with longstanding Fourth Amendment law until 
a consistent principle has been identified and articulated.315 
Second, a police department’s failure to account for the 
likely and invidious effects of its practices on the community 
could be conceived as a failure of substantive due process, even 
if the individual members of the community would have diffi-
culty proving that the department violated established individ-
ual rights.316 For example, if allegations that U.S. Border Patrol 
 
 313. 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2001) (amended by Pub. L. No. 107-156, § 215 
(2001)) (expired June 1, 2015). The constitutionality of the bulk metadata col-
lection is a bit of a puzzle; federal courts split over whether the program was 
or was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the Supreme Court did 
not have the opportunity to clear up the irreconcilable differences in the prec-
edents. See generally Orin Kerr, What Will Happen to the Section 215 Cases?, 
WASH. POST (June 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh 
-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/09/what-will-happen-to-the-section-215-cases.  
 314. See Charlie Savage & David E. Sanger, Senate Panel Presses N.S.A. on 
Phone Logs, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/ 
us/nsa-surveillance.html (quoting Senator Patrick J. Leahy). 
 315. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia invalidated the 
bulk metadata collection program using the Fourth Amendment. Klayman v. 
Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 37–42 (D.D.C. 2013). However, the court’s decision 
has irreconcilable conflicts with Fourth Amendment precedent establishing 
the third party doctrine and the national security exceptions. See, e.g., United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) (establishing the third party 
doctrine); see also United States v. U.S. District Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. 
Div., 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972) (establishing a qualified exception to Fourth 
Amendment protections when the government is investigating a national se-
curity risk). 
 316. Gillian Metzger has identified and praised a range of efforts among 
federal agencies to engage in their own form of “constitutionalism”—that is, 
their own attempts to provide guidance and responsibly administer their func-
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has systematically ignored complaints of unjustified seizures or 
uses of force, that history could create a basis for a challenge.317 
Likewise, the City of New York Civilian Complaint Review 
Board’s report finding that the New York Police Department 
failed to enforce its own policy against the use of chokeholds for 
a sustained period of time should create a basis for a due pro-
cess challenge.318 More generally, a department’s consistent 
failure to monitor and penalize its agents when they abuse 
their powers irrationally promotes poor behavior and could be a 
basis for a substantive due process challenge. Charles Sabel 
and William Simon have nicely described the course of justice 
in the criminal law enforcement context by noting that while 
first-generation problems typically involve single bad actor 
abuses of power (intentionally harmful conduct), the next gen-
eration of problems involves bureaucratic abuses of power and 
willful neglect.319  
As the Fifth Circuit’s rational basis case on the restriction 
of coffin sales shows, the irrationality test also has the poten-
tial to affect economic regulations not because they interfere 
with an individual right to laissez-faire economic freedoms, but 
because they fail to promote public welfare on any political or 
economic philosophical account. This type of due process argu-
 
tions with an eye toward constitutional values. See generally Gillian E. Metz-
ger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013). Metzger 
may oversell the value and independence of administrative efforts to interpret 
the Constitution, but to the extent such exercises are useful, the Due Process 
Clauses can supply a source of recourse if a federal or local agency fails to 
make some minimal efforts at designing systems that are consistent with con-
stitutional values. 
 317. Brian Bennett, Border Patrol Agents Rarely Disciplined in Abuse Cas-
es, Records Show, L.A. TIMES (May 9, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la 
-na-border-force-20140510-story.html (finding that only 13 out of 809 abuse 
complaints sent to the agency’s internal affairs unit resulted in discipline). 
 318. CITY OF N.Y. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BD., A MUTATED RULE: 
LACK OF ENFORCEMENT IN THE FACE OF PERSISTENT CHOKEHOLD COM-
PLAINTS IN NEW YORK CITY: AN EVALUATION OF CHOKEHOLD ALLEGATIONS 
AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE N.Y.P.D. FROM JANUARY 2009 THROUGH JUNE 2014 
(2014), http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/Chokehold%20Study_2014 
1007.pdf.  
 319. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Due Process of Administration: 
The Problem of Police Accountability, 33 YALE J. REG. (forthcoming 2016). The 
authors embrace the Due Process Clause as a potential source of remedies. Id. 
at *3 (“The duty of responsible administration might have been derived 
through judicial interpretation of the constitutional due process clauses . . . .”). 
But see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52 (1975) (upholding agency procedure 
that combined prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in a due process and 
separation of powers challenge, on grounds that “[t]he incredible variety of 
administrative [systems] in this country will not yield to any organizing prin-
ciple”). 
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ment could be useful in current legal controversies related to 
the (arguably) needless licensing required to provide teeth 
whitening services320 or to bans of direct sales of Tesla automo-
biles.321 
These applications may never grow to be as robust as the 
due process and equal protection rights developed in the gay 
rights cases. Those cases model the most formidable buildup of 
protections stemming from the rational basis test. Norms and 
tolerance shifted slowly. During that shift, the fluidity and gov-
ernment-deferential posture of a rational basis test made intel-
lectual, normative, and pragmatic sense.  
In other areas courts likewise may begin with caution and 
reserve that comes automatically with the rational basis test 
and move organically to identify specific examples where a 
more solidified, “fundamental rights” approach may be war-
ranted. However, this refinement and solidification of more ro-
bust rights may never be appropriate in some contexts. Indeed, 
unlike sexual orientation classifications—which now fit com-
fortably into a “presumptively irrational” silo—due process 
challenges to systems of law enforcement or to economic regu-
lations will cover too much regulatory territory, with too many 
contextual variations, to make a monolithic declaration of pre-
sumptively protected rights or groups. Thus, retaining the ver-
satile due process floor is likely to prove particularly useful in 
dealing with what is arguably the single most important mod-
ern constitutional problem: balancing individual liberties with 
legitimate government regulatory power. 
We do not here support any shift or expansion in due pro-
cess methodology, or endorse any particular due process rights 
outcomes that might flow more easily from such a shift than 
from the current doctrine. Rather, our purpose is to underscore 
that these rational basis cases already are part of the due pro-
cess doctrine322 and lend recent support to our argument that 
 
 320. North Carolina Bd. of Dental Exam’rs. v. F.T.C., No. 13-534, slip op. at 
2 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2015) (holding that a state dental board did not qualify for 
Parker doctrine immunity from antitrust laws because the state did not active-
ly regulate the board, which was composed of market participants). 
 321. H.B. 5606, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014); see John Voelcker, Tesla 
Direct Sales Ban in Michigan Called “Corrupt Politics at Its Worst,” 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/ 
In-Gear/2014/1022/Tesla-direct-sales-ban-in-Michigan-called-corrupt-politics-
at-its-worst (reporting criticism of Michigan’s ban on the direct sale of Tesla 
automobiles).  
 322. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 433 (1985) 
(striking down a restrictive special use permit requirement as irrational under 
equal protection); see also Armour v. Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2084–85 
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the rare use of the rational basis floor to overturn laws on the 
ground that they violate baseline principles of liberty and re-
spect is sensible, even inevitable.323  
  CONCLUSION   
In Sister Mary Ignatius Explains It All For You, the lead 
character is a nun who stands in front of the audience and an-
swers hard questions about Catholic dogma and faith in gen-
eral.325 She holds a stack of note cards with queries, and primly 
and confidently responds to them.326 One card asks, “Are all our 
prayers answered?”327 Sister Mary Ignatius responds, “Yes, they 
are! What people who ask that question often don’t realize is 
that sometimes the answer to our prayers is ‘no.’”328 
Legal challenges to outrageous or irrational state conduct 
are a lot like our heavenly appeals: the answer is usually “no.” 
Perhaps this is why legal claims often are framed as prayers for 
relief—they betray a faith that the worst injustices might be 
redressed by a higher power.329 The outrageousness and ration-
 
(2012) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Board of Public Works as-
sessment scheme was irrational under equal protection); Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202, 203 (1987) (plurality opinion) (striking down the denial of funding 
for public education for children of non-documented persons for being irration-
al under equal protection); Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) 
(holding that the “‘unrelated’ person” provision was irrelevant to the stated 
purpose of the Food Stamp Act and violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause); cf. Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1067 (9th Cir. 
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 889 (holding that even under rational basis re-
view of equal protection, there was no legitimate interest rationally related to 
state decision to treat Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals immigrants dif-
ferently from other citizens who were allowed to use Employment Authoriza-
tion Documents as proof of authorized presence in United States when apply-
ing for a driver’s license). 
 323. As Victoria Nourse correctly observes, the need for “balance between 
the needs of individuals and the needs of the common welfare . . . has not dis-
appeared: one can see its resurgence in a number of areas of current substan-
tive due process law.” Nourse, supra note 19, at 798. 
 325. CHRISTOPHER DURANG, SISTER MARY IGNATIUS EXPLAINS IT ALL FOR 
YOU, AND THE ACTOR’S NIGHTMARE (Dramatists Play Serv., Inc., rev. ed. 1995) 
(1980). 
 326. Well, all but one. The one unanswered card asks: “If God is all power-
ful, why does He allow evil in the world?” The nun reads the question aloud, 
and then wordlessly places the note card back at the bottom of the stack. This 
moment in the play, which recurs, is hilarious—in a dark way, of course. Id. at 
32, 35. 
 327. Id. at 37. 
 328. Id.  
 329. Put more eloquently, as only Cardozo could:  
By conscious or subconscious influence, the presence of this restrain-
ing power, aloof in the background, but none the less always in re-
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al basis tests are built on that faith and serve important ex-
pressive, remedial, and occasionally generative ends.  
Both tests have suffered from the effects of popular misun-
derstanding and undeserved mistrust. The judicial practice of 
the last half-century disproves the dire predictions of judicial 
overuse that currently blight their reputations.  
In fact, the outrageous and irrational tests share three en-
during features: they police the worst-case scenarios of gov-
ernment abuse; they are highly context-specific standards that 
defy formalistic summary; and, occasionally, their claimants 
succeed. 
 
 
 
 
serve, tends to stabilize and rationalize the legislative judgment, to 
infuse it with the glow of principle, to hold the standard aloft and vis-
ible for those who must run the race and keep the faith.  
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 93 (1921). 
